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Executive Summary 
Introduction  
 
Markets for customer-sited photovoltaic (PV) systems are expanding rapidly, albeit from a small 
base.  Government incentives aimed at encouraging reductions in the cost of PV over time are 
the principal drivers for the recent worldwide growth in grid-connected PV capacity.  
 
This report provides an in-depth statistical analysis of PV system costs in California.  Through 
mid-November 2005, a total of 130 MWAC of grid-connected solar capacity was installed 
throughout California,i making that state the dominant market for PV in the United States, 
though it still stands a distant third on a worldwide basis behind Germany and Japan.   
 
The results presented here are based on an analysis of 18,942 grid-connected PV systems totaling 
254 MWAC,ii either installed, approved for installation, or waitlisted (approved but awaiting 
program funding) under what are currently the two largest PV programs in the state.  This 
analysis provides insights on California’s PV market by exploring cost trends, and by untangling 
the various factors that affect the cost of PV systems.  Results also have important policy 
ramifications, as they address the interaction between incentive levels and installed costs, and the 
relative cost of different PV applications.   
 
California’s Solar Programs 
 
California’s PV market is driven by a mixture of state and local incentives.  Most prominent are 
capital cost rebates – denominated in $ per Watt – offered to PV system installers or owners to 
“buy down” the installed cost of solar installations.  The two most significant current rebate 
programs are overseen by the California Energy Commission (CEC) and the California Public 
Utilities Commission (CPUC), and it is on these two programs that our analysis is based.   
 
The CEC has administered a PV rebate program since March 1998, focusing more recently on 
grid-connected systems under 30 kW in size.  The CPUC’s program began accepting 
applications in July 2001, and provides rebates to PV systems of at least 30 kW in size.  Both 
programs primarily target customers served by the state’s investor-owned utilities.iii  Over time, 
both programs have altered the structure and size of their incentives for PV installations, as 
shown in Figure ES-1.  In particular, the CEC initiated five gradual reductions beginning in 
2003, while the CPUC imposed a single large reduction in late 2004 and a more recent reduction 
in mid-December 2005.  On January 12, 2006, the CPUC ordered a dramatic expansion of these 
programs with a $3.2 billion, 11-year program of declining incentives.  
                                                 
i This estimate of 130 MWAC includes PV systems funded under municipal utility programs, in addition to the CEC 
and CPUC programs analyzed in this report. 
ii Unless explicitly presented as otherwise, data on PV capacity and costs are expressed throughout this report in 
terms of WAC (e.g., WAC, kWAC, MWAC, $/WAC), which we convert (where necessary) from WDC-STC (DC Watts at 
standard test conditions) using a de-rate factor of 0.84.  We acknowledge that many other solar programs and data 
sources use WDC-STC, making comparisons of California data with those in other states and countries more difficult.  
Given, however, that our underlying system cost data is expressed in terms of WAC, this is the standard that we use. 
iii At various times, customers of publicly-owned utilities have also been eligible to participate. 
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Analysis Results 
 
The CEC dataset used for our analysis was updated through April 2005, and contains 17,889 data 
records (72.8 MWAC), including 12,856 completed systems (48.5 MWAC) and 5,033 systems that 
had been approved for a rebate, but that were awaiting completion at the time we received the 
dataset (24.3 MWAC).  The CPUC program generally covers systems of at least 30 kW, and our 
dataset includes 1,053 data records (180.8 MWAC), including 327 completed systems (35.7 
MWAC), 464 approved systems (73.4 MWAC), and 262 waitlisted systems (71.7 MWAC).  
Analysis of each dataset was conducted using multivariate regression techniques; the dependent 
variable was the pre-rebate installed cost of PV systems, in 2004 $/WAC.  Key findings include: 
 
Solar Costs Have Declined Substantially Over Time, But Less So Under the CPUC’s Program:  
In real dollar terms, average pre-rebate total installed costs under the CEC’s program have 
declined substantially, from more than $12/WAC (2004 $) in 1998 to less then $9/WAC for 2004-
05 (see Figure ES-2, where time is expressed in quarter-year intervals).  Regression results show 
annual average cost reductions among the CEC-funded systems of approximately $0.70/WAC, 
representing a 7.3% annual decline.  Larger systems (e.g., 10-30 kW) funded by the CEC are 
found to have experienced more modest cost reductions than have smaller systems.   
 
As suggested by Figure ES-2, some of the overall cost reductions within the CEC program are 
due to decreases in worldwide module costs (notwithstanding the recent increase in those 
costs).iv  In fact, regression results confirm that changes in worldwide module costs have largely 
been passed through directly to PV system purchasers on a one-for-one basis.  Much of the 
                                                 
iv Although the CEC database does, in some cases, contain disaggregated information on module, inverter, and labor 
costs, this information is only sparsely reported (and the CPUC database does not provide such information at all).  
As a result, we have used an external index of worldwide module costs over time from Strategies Unlimited to proxy 
module costs for each California system.  Non-module costs are then simply the total system cost less the relevant 
module cost index value.  Though it would be interesting to more narrowly pinpoint specific drivers of cost 
reductions, given current limitations in the data, the best we can do is to crudely split total costs into module and 
non-module costs.  Collecting and analyzing more-detailed cost disaggregations data is an area ripe for future work. 
 ii
overall cost reduction, however, has come from improvements in non-module costs – e.g., 
installation and balance of system costs. 
 
This reduction in non-module costs for CEC-funded systems is encouraging.  Unlike module 
costs, which are set in a worldwide market and are therefore heavily influenced by factors 
outside of the control of an individual PV program (e.g., demand for PV in Japan and Germany), 
non-module costs are potentially subject to the influence of local PV programs.  And given (as 
noted above) that changes in worldwide module costs appear to simply flow through directly to 
total system costs, reducing non-module costs may be the most appropriate goal for local PV 
programs.  Though we are unable to prove conclusively that non-module cost reductions in 
California have been caused by the state’s incentive programs, our analysis results do show that 
non-module cost reductions have been significant.   
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Figure ES-2.  Costs Trends Over Time (CEC and CPUC) 
 
In contrast to the longer-running CEC program, which exhibits clear downward cost trends over 
time, costs under the CPUC’s program have declined more moderately (though Figure ES-2 does 
show a more substantial decline – in lock-step with the CEC program – since 2003).  Compared 
to the $0.70/WAC (7.3%) average cost reduction in the CEC dataset, regression results show that 
systems funded by the CPUC have seen annual average reductions of $0.36/WAC (4.1%).v  A 
regression of the combined CEC and CPUC datasets over the time period in which the two 
programs overlap shows similar annual reductions:  $0.91/WAC (CEC) and $0.36/WAC (CPUC). 
 
The more-aggressive (and visually apparent) CEC cost reductions may be due to the larger 
proportional labor and installation costs associated with smaller (< 30 kW) systems and the 
greater opportunities in that market segment for distribution and installation efficiency gains.vi  
Alternatively, it could be a result of policy design – whereas the CEC has (since 2003) gradually 
                                                 
v Though Figure ES-2 does not provide a clear visual trend of declining system costs over the entire duration of the 
CPUC program, the regression results – by controlling for other factors – are more reliable than the visual evidence 
provided in the Figure. 
vi We find this same effect – smaller systems exhibiting greater cost reductions over time – not only across 
programs, but also within each of the two programs. 
 iii
lowered its rebate over time, the CPUC has been slower to follow suit (see Figure ES-1).  
Though Figure ES-2 – which shows the CEC and CPUC costs declining lock-step since 2003 – 
would appear to discount these explanations, it is important to note the bivariate nature of Figure 
ES-2, and its failure to control for other variables (in contrast to multivariate regression analysis, 
which isolates the impact of each individual variable).  Nonetheless, the quality of our data does 
not allow us to definitively explain the difference in cost reductions between the two programs, 
or even prove that the programs themselves are responsible for the cost reductions.vii  We 
recommend that future work explore these questions in more detail.   
 
Policy Incentives and Rebate Levels Impact Pre-Rebate Installed Costs:  Figure ES-3 shows a 
tight relationship between standard rebate levels and average pre-rebate installed costs among the 
CEC-funded systems since mid-2000.  This close relationship is confirmed through regression 
analysis.  In particular, we find that each $1/WAC change in the rebate level has, on average, 
yielded a $0.55-0.80/WAC change in pre-rebate installed costs (with the range representing 
results from different regression models).  In other words, when the CEC increased its rebate 
level by $1.5/WAC in early 2001, system purchasers may have only realized $0.3-$0.7/WAC of 
that increase on average, with the remaining $0.8-$1.2/WAC being “captured” by system retailers 
or installers through correspondingly higher prices.  By the same token, regression results 
suggest that as the CEC has gradually reduced its rebate level since early 2003, system retailers 
have absorbed some of the decrease by reducing prices. 
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We also find some evidence that the existence of the percentage rebate cap prior to 2003 may 
have increased pre-rebate system costs somewhat under the CEC program.  This result is 
                                                 
vii Though it is perhaps logical to assume that California’s PV programs have caused, or at least contributed to, the 
empirical cost reductions, nothing in our analysis enables us to assign causation – i.e., we are unable to definitively 
conclude that the California programs are driving the cost reductions.  To be able to assign causation, we would 
need to similarly analyze a “control” market – i.e., one in which no PV incentive programs exist.  Identifying such a 
market for PV may be difficult or impossible, given the widespread public support that PV has garnered, but future 
work could at least analyze other markets in which PV is subsidized, but to a different extent or in a different 
manner than in California. 
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consistent with widespread speculation that this cap – which limited the size of the rebate to 50% 
of total eligible costs in an attempt to ensure that the program did not over-subsidize lower-cost 
eligible technologies (such as small wind) – has, perversely, encouraged artificial cost inflation 
as a way to maximize the dollar amount of the rebate. 
 
Analysis of the CPUC dataset yields results that are substantially less policy-rich than those from 
the CEC’s dataset.  Nonetheless, we find evidence to support the oft-heard claim in California 
that the CPUC’s richer incentives in recent years ($4.5/WAC until December 2004, with a 50% 
cap) have not motivated system cost reductions to the same extent as under the CEC’s program 
(the CEC’s program also offered $4.5/WAC, but reduced that incentive earlier and more rapidly 
than did the CPUC – see Figure ES-1).  As supported by Figure ES-4, regression results show 
that, among similar sized systems (20-40 kW), those funded by the CPUC’s program have had 
pre-rebate installed costs that are on average roughly $0.60/WAC higher than those funded by the 
CEC.  Furthermore, some of the systems in the CPUC dataset received sizable local incentives 
(of more than $2/WAC), in addition to those offered under the CPUC’s program.  These systems 
recorded higher average costs of roughly $0.60/WAC than did equivalent systems that did not 
have access to additional incentives.  We also find some evidence (though not through the 
regression analysis) that the percentage rebate cap in place prior to December 2004 affected PV 
pricing during that period.  
 
California has also offered a state income tax credit for systems under 200 kW in size, ranging 
from 7.5% to 15% of installed costs, depending on the year of installation.  Statistical analysis of 
both the CEC and CPUC datasets offers evidence that the existence and size of the state tax 
credit has increased pre-rebate installed costs to some degree.  Retail electricity rates, on the 
other hand, are not found to affect pre-rebate total installed costs, though as discussed in the 
body of the report, our retail electricity rate variable is imperfect.   
 
In aggregate, these results suggest that heavy subsidies dampen, to some degree, the motivation 
of installers to provide, and/or customers to seek, lower installed costs.viii
 
Economies of Scale Drive Down Costs as System Size Increases:  Focusing on the period in 
which both the CPUC and CEC programs were operating simultaneously, Figure ES-4 shows 
that average system costs fall substantially for larger systems (i.e., there are economies of scale) 
in both datasets, though both datasets also show a leveling off of those economies among larger 
system sizes.  Regression results confirm these trends.  The largest systems in the CEC dataset 
are roughly $2.5/WAC cheaper than 1 kW installations.  Meanwhile, the largest CPUC-funded 
systems are roughly $1.5/WAC less expensive than the smaller systems funded by that program.ix
 
                                                 
viii Though some might be inclined to read into these results an argument for switching from capacity-based to 
performance-based incentives, we note that there is nothing in our dataset or analysis that allows us to comment on 
the relative superiority of one incentive type over another. 
ix The up tick in average installed costs for CPUC systems sized between 60 and 100 kW is somewhat of an 
anomaly, being heavily influenced by 59 identical applications (out of 209 total applications in this size range), all 
submitted on the same day, by the same installer, and at the same estimated installed cost of $9.82/WAC (2004$). 
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Systems Installed in Large New Home Developments and in Affordable Housing Projects 
Experience Much Lower Costs:  Regression results show that systems installed (or planned for 
installation) under the CEC’s program in large new residential developments (totaling 1,946 
systems) have lower costs of approximately $1.2/WAC, on average, compared to the general 
retrofit market.  Similarly, the 340 systems used in affordable housing applications, which often 
involve new construction and presumably enable bulk system installation, exhibit costs that are 
$1.9/WAC lower than the general retrofit market.  Systems installed in single new homes (or 
small clusters of new homes) exhibit modestly higher costs of approximately $0.18/WAC, 
perhaps due to the custom-designed nature of many of these systems, as well as a lack of the 
economies of scale possible in larger new home developments.  Systems installed at schools 
(most are retrofits) do not have statistically significant differences in cost compared to the 
general retrofit market.   
 
Installer Experience and Type Affects Costs:  Within the CEC program, more-experienced 
installers and retailers are found to charge slightly more for their services – approximately 
$0.29/WAC and $0.17/WAC, respectively – relative to those with less experience.  In contrast, 
more-experienced installers under the CPUC’s program have priced their systems at lower levels 
than less-experienced installers, with a differential of nearly $0.70/WAC on average.  The reason 
for this discrepancy between the two programs is unclear.  Meanwhile, owner-installed systems 
in the CEC program (n=862) are found to have considerably lower reported costs than 
contractor-installed systems, with a $1.8/WAC savings on average.  Similarly, the sixteen CPUC-
funded systems installed at fairgrounds by the California Construction Authority have come in at 
a substantially lower cost than other systems, with a cost differential of roughly $4/WAC, on 
average.x  These results suggest that the CEC’s current practice of providing reduced incentives 
for owner-installed systems is appropriate. 
                                                 
x The California Construction Authority (CCA) is a Joint Powers Authority organized in August 1988 to provide 
financing, design, inspection and construction management services for fairgrounds throughout California.  The low 
cost of the CCA systems is perhaps partially attributable to bulk equipment purchases for multiple fairground 
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The Impact of Module Type Varies By Program:  In the CEC dataset, projects using thin film 
PV technology – of which there are 318 – are found to have had systematically lower costs than 
those relying on traditional crystalline silicon, with a differential of roughly $0.70/WAC on 
average, though this cost differential has narrowed over time.  Though only bordering on 
statistical significance, projects using thin film technology in the CPUC dataset – of which there 
are 111 – are found to have slightly higher costs on average over the course of that program 
(~$0.20/WAC).  The reason for this discrepancy between the two programs is unclear. 
 
System Location Has Impacted Costs:  The population density of the location of installation 
appears to have some effect on system costs in the CEC dataset, with more densely populated 
areas experiencing higher average costs.  This finding is consistent with the idea that population 
density may be a proxy for the cost of living, and therefore labor costs.  Meanwhile, CEC-funded 
systems installed outside of PG&E’s service territory report lower average pre-rebate costs than 
those installed within PG&E’s service territory.  In contrast, CPUC-funded systems installed 
outside of PG&E’s territory report higher pre-rebate costs on average.  Further analysis would be 
required to understand why costs vary by service territory, and why these effects vary between 
the CEC- and CPUC-funded systems.   
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Results presented here reveal a number of expected, and some unexpected, trends.  Perhaps of 
most importance, we find substantial reductions in PV system costs over time, especially among 
systems funded by the CEC’s program.  Although our analysis cannot, without comparison to a 
control group, definitively conclude that the CEC and CPUC programs caused these cost 
reductions, it is clear that – despite the lack of continuity and stability experienced by both 
programs – pre-rebate installed costs have come down.   
 
Several policy recommendations derive from our analysis: 
 
• Reducing non-module costs should be a primary goal of local PV programs.  Unlike 
module costs, which are set in a worldwide market and are therefore heavily influenced by 
factors outside of the control of an individual PV program, non-module costs are potentially 
subject to the influence of local programs.  State policymakers may wish to undertake 
programmatic activities aimed specifically at reducing non-module costs, which could range 
from targeted approaches to building local supply infrastructure (e.g., providing business 
development funding to installers, supporting standardized PV products, or offering installer 
training and certification), to something as simple as making PV system cost and 
performance data more publicly accessible to further encourage supply competition. 
 
• Sustained, long-term programs may enable more significant cost reductions.  Sustained, 
sizable, and stable markets for PV may be the most direct way of reducing non-module costs 
because such markets will presumably attract suppliers and encourage those suppliers to 
                                                                                                                                                             
projects.  Some have also speculated that the CCA is able to install systems at apparently lower costs than the PV 
industry at large due to the fact that it has no marketing, sales, or overhead costs, and/or that certain internal costs 
are not reported.  In other words, CCA-installed systems in the CPUC program are essentially the equivalent of 
owner-installed systems in the CEC program. 
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create an efficient delivery infrastructure.  Though PV cost reductions in California are 
significant, at least among CEC-funded systems, experience from Japan suggests that deeper 
cost reductions are possible with a more sustained policy effort.  In mid-January 2006, the 
CPUC issued an order that intends to create such a market with an 11-year, ~$3.2 billion 
program of declining incentives.  A goal of the adopted program is to reduce rebate levels by 
roughly 10% each year, in nominal terms, far exceeding the recent system cost reductions 
seen under the California and Japanese programs. 
 
• The structure and size of PV incentives should encourage cost reduction, not cost 
inflation.  We find some troubling evidence that policy design has adversely impacted the 
cost of PV systems in California.  For example, the 50% cap on the size of the rebate 
employed by both programs at one time or another appears to have, at best, impeded cost 
reductions, and at worst, contributed to artificial cost inflation.  As such, the decision by both 
programs to abandon such percentage caps is a positive development; we encourage other PV 
programs to do the same.  Furthermore, the total pre-rebate cost of PV installations in 
California has tracked, to some degree, the size of the rebate itself.  Whether this link is 
merely representative of the “teething problems” that are typical of new programs,xi or 
should instead be of long-term concern is somewhat unclear.  As rebates are reduced over 
time, however, we expect that the link between incentive levels and pre-rebate installed costs 
will be severed, as lower rebates require contractors to price systems at cost in order to 
ensure a sale.  Hence, while rich incentives may be required initially to jump-start the market, 
over time the incentives should decline to a level that can support a functional market 
infrastructure without providing room for potential price manipulation. 
 
• Targeted incentives that account for the relative economics of different system sizes and 
application types may be appropriate.  Though there is a significant spread in the data, our 
analysis shows that installed costs are heavily dependent upon the size and type of 
installation.   We find clear evidence of sizable economies of scale in PV installations.  We 
also find that systems installed in large new home developments are, on average, far more 
economical than retrofitted systems.  These results suggest that a further targeting of 
incentives to account for the relative economics of different system sizes and application 
types may be appropriate. 
 
 
                                                 
xi Such “teething problems” might include initial over-subsidization intended to spur the market, coupled with 
insufficient supply infrastructure to handle the resulting increase in demand, leading to lackluster competition and 
artificial price increases until new supply infrastructure enters the market. 
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1. Introduction 
Markets for solar photovoltaic (PV) systems are expanding rapidly, albeit from a small base.  In 
2004, more than 955 MWAC of PV capacity was installed worldwide, up from 658 MWAC in 
2003 (Maycock 2005).1  The growth in worldwide annual capacity additions has averaged 
approximately 35% since 1996 (Maycock 2005), dominated by grid-connected applications.  The 
global PV market had an estimated $11 billion in revenue in 2004 (Rogel 2005).  
 
Despite this vigorous growth, the share of worldwide electricity demand met with photovoltaic 
power remains miniscule, well below 0.1%, and the aggregate expected electricity supply from 
the PV capacity added in 2004 equates to just one natural gas-fired baseload generating plant (or 
perhaps a dozen gas-fired peaking plants).  The primary constraint to future expansion is 
economics.  Simply put, solar PV is not yet cost-competitive in most grid-connected 
applications, and substantial cost reductions will be required for PV to meaningfully contribute 
to worldwide electricity supply (U.S. DOE 2005; Chaudhari et al. 2005; van der Zwaan and Rabl 
2004; Poponi 2003).  The good news is that significant cost reductions are possible, and some 
believe that solar power will have a bright future in a world in which environmental, security, 
and supply constraints could dampen interest in conventional generation (Rogel 2005; Makower 
and Pernick 2004; Pacala and Socolow 2004; Payne et al. 2001; U.S. DOE 2005).     
 
Local, state, and federal government incentives are (and will continue to be) the principal drivers 
for the recent growth in grid-connected PV capacity (see, e.g., Haas 2003; Osborn et al. 2005; 
Bolinger and Wiser 2002; Duke et al. 2005).  Common programs include rebates on the capital 
cost of the installations, high fixed tariffs paid for PV supply, tax incentives, and mandates for 
electricity suppliers to use solar power to meet customer demand.  These policies are motivated 
by the widespread popular appeal of solar power, and the positive attributes of PV – modest 
environmental impacts, avoidance of fuel price and supply risks, coincidence with peak electrical 
demand, distributed generation located at the point of use, and installation modularity.   
 
A key goal of these policy efforts is that of market transformation:  to drive down the cost of PV 
over time to a level that does not require substantial government stimulation.  The cost of PV 
installations is not uniform, however, and can vary based on time, system size, type of 
installation (e.g., retrofit vs. new home), installer experience, and other factors.  Solar costs 
might also be affected by the level and design of policy incentives provided to those installations.   
 
This paper presents the results of a statistical evaluation of cost trends in California’s market for 
residential and commercial grid-connected PV.  It is based on an analysis of 18,942 PV systems, 
totaling 254 MW, that as of mid-2005 had either been completed, approved, or waitlisted (i.e., 
approved but awaiting additional program funding) under California’s two largest solar rebate 
programs:  those operated by the California Energy Commission and California Public Utilities 
                                                 
1 Unless explicitly presented as otherwise, data on PV capacity and costs are expressed throughout this report in 
terms of WAC (e.g., WAC, kWAC, MWAC, $/WAC), which we convert (where necessary) from WDC-STC (DC Watts at 
standard test conditions) using a de-rate factor of 0.84.  We acknowledge that many other solar programs and data 
sources use WDC-STC, making comparisons of California data with those in other states and countries more difficult.  
Given, however, that our underlying system cost data is expressed in terms of WAC, this is the standard that we use. 
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Commission.2  This analysis provides insights on California’s PV market by exploring cost 
trends over time, and by helping to untangle the various factors that affect the installed cost of 
PV systems.  Results may also have important policy ramifications in as much as they address 
the interaction between incentive levels and installed costs, and the relative cost of different solar 
applications.   
 
A sizable literature has developed that explores historical PV cost trends.  Much of this literature 
has used learning or experience curve theory to explore how increases in cumulative PV 
production have driven costs down over time.  Findings from this literature vary, but most 
studies show that each doubling of cumulative production has historically led to a reduction in 
module prices of approximately 20% (see, e.g., Kobos et al. in press; McDonald and 
Schrattenholzer 2001; Neij 1997; IEA 2000; Schaeffer et al. 2004).  Others have extrapolated 
these findings to argue that government deployment support for PV may be warranted to drive 
the industry down its learning curve and ultimately achieve costs that are comparable to or better 
than the cost of conventional electricity sources (see, e.g., van der Zwaan and Rabl 2004; Duke 
and Kammen 1999; Duke 2002).3  
 
Our study has a narrower focus in that it seeks to uncover interesting cost trends from a single 
PV market.  In so doing, the results presented here are expected to be of use to California’s 
energy policymakers and stakeholders as existing solar incentive programs are revised, and as 
new and expanded programs are implemented.  With a mid-January 2006 California Public 
Utilities Commission order to establish an 11-year, ~$3.2 billion program of declining incentives 
for PV, the results of this analysis are timely.  Of course, California is not alone in its support for 
photovoltaic markets:  a large number of other U.S. states also offer significant incentives for PV 
(Bolinger and Wiser 2002; Bolinger and Wiser 2003; Chen et al. 2005; Gouchoe et al. 2002), and 
new tax policies at the federal level promise to further stimulate the U.S. market in the years to 
come.  A detailed exploration of PV cost trends in California may be of use for benchmarking 
purposes in these other markets.  Finally, because California is the third largest market for PV 
worldwide, the results presented here are expected to be of broad international interest. 
 
We begin in Section 2 of this paper by describing California’s photovoltaic market.  Section 3 
then discusses the data that we obtained for our analysis, and the statistical methods used to 
evaluate those data.  Section 4 presents multivariate regression results from our analysis of 
smaller residential and commercial solar installations (< 30 kW).  Section 5 presents similar 
results from our analysis of larger commercial installations (generally ranging from 30 kW to as 
large as 1 MW).  Section 6 compares the two datasets.  We end the paper in Section 7 by 
highlighting important implications and conclusions. 
 
                                                 
2 Future analysis could expand this evaluation to look at cross-state and perhaps cross-country comparisons of 
installed costs, and could use more up-to-date California data. 
3 Other studies that have explored average costs and (to a lesser degree) cost trends in the U.S. in recent years have 
focused on: Florida (Szaro 2003), LADWP (Honles 2003), Pennsylvania (Celentano 2005), a sample of 278 systems 
throughout the U.S. (Mortensen 2001), and projects funded under the TEAM-UP Program (SEPA 2001a, 2001b).  
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2. The California Solar Market in Context 
2.1 Market Overview 
California is the dominant market for PV in the United States, though it still stands a distant third 
on a worldwide basis behind Japan and Germany.  According to the International Energy Agency 
(IEA), Japan added 228 MWAC of solar PV capacity in 2004 for a cumulative total of 951 
MWAC.  The size of Germany’s market is in some dispute, with the IEA reporting that the 
country added 305 MWAC in 2004, for a cumulative 667 MWAC, while Photon International 
reports 647 MWAC of additions in 2004 for a cumulative total of 1146 MWAC.4  Japan and 
Germany have used gradually declining capital rebates and high fixed power purchase tariffs, 
respectively, to spur market expansion.  In aggregate, these two markets accounted for at least 
60% of worldwide PV demand in 2004.  The IEA reports that the U.S. added 76 MWAC
AC AC
 of PV in 
2004 (including 52 MW  of grid-connected capacity), for a cumulative total of 307 MW . 
 
The California Energy Commission reports that California alone added more than 36 MWAC of 
grid-connected PV in 2004.  Through mid-November 2005, 130 MWAC of grid-connected PV 
capacity was installed in California; Figure 1 shows the dramatic growth in the market since the 
year 2000 (data for 2005 represents a partial year, through mid-November).5  According to 
SolarBuzz (2005), in 2004, California’s grid-connected PV additions represented approximately 
85% of all grid-connected additions in the United States.6
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Figure 1.  Grid-Connected Solar Capacity in California, through November 15, 2005 
 
                                                 
4 For IEA data, see: http://www.oja-services.nl/iea-pvps/isr/index.htm. For Photon International data, see Photon 
International (2005).  Data are converted from DC Watts at standard test conditions (as reported) to AC Watts using 
a de-rate factor of 0.84. 
5 The data presented in Figure 1, which includes systems installed under municipal utility programs, comes from the 
California Energy Commission’s website, accessed on January 2, 2006:  
http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/emerging_renewables/GRID-CONNECTED_PV.XLS.  
6 IEA and CEC data, on the other hand, suggest that California’s grid-connected PV market in 2004 represented 
70% of the U.S. total (36 MWAC out of 52 MWAC).   
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2.2 Policy Incentives 
California’s grid-connected PV market is driven by a mixture of state and local incentives.  Most 
prominent are capital cost rebates – denominated in $ per Watt – offered to PV system installers 
or owners to “buy down” the installed cost of solar installations.  By reducing the cost of PV 
installations, these programs aim to increase PV sales, which should encourage manufacturers, 
sellers, and installers to expand their operations and improve distribution channels, thereby 
inducing overall system cost reductions.  The two most significant current rebate programs are 
overseen by the California Energy Commission (CEC) and the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC), but significant rebates are also offered by the state’s publicly owned 
utilities (e.g., SMUD, LADWP – see Figure 1).  
 
California Energy Commission:  The CEC has administered a PV rebate program (called the 
“Emerging Renewables Program”7) since March 1998, funded primarily by ratepayers of the 
state’s investor-owned electric utilities (IOUs).  From program inception to February 2003, the 
CEC provided rebates to both small and large PV systems installed by customers taking electric 
service from one of the state’s IOUs.  Starting in March 2003, the program has focused primarily 
on residential and small commercial systems under 30 kW in size.8  As of May 2005, the CEC 
had paid out roughly $196 million of incentive funds to nearly 13,000 completed PV systems 
totaling 51 MWAC of capacity.  An additional $80 million was encumbered to approximately 
5,000 (25 MWAC) approved but not yet completed PV systems.9  Historically, approximately 
70% of all applications have resulted in completed systems.10
 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC):  The CPUC’s Self-Generation Incentive 
Program (SGIP) was established as a direct result of the state’s energy crisis, and began 
accepting applications in July 2001.  The program provides rebates for customer-sited PV 
systems of at least 30 kW in size (systems can exceed 1 MW in size, but the rebate only applies 
to the first 1 MW) and installed by customers taking electric or gas service from one of the 
state’s IOUs.  SGIP funds are collected from electric and gas ratepayers.  As of June 2005, the 
program had paid out $142 million in incentive funds to 327 completed PV systems totaling 
nearly 36 MWAC of capacity.  An additional $300 million was obligated to 465 approved but not 
yet completed PV systems (totaling 74 MWAC). 265 systems, totaling more than $250 million of 
rebate funds, were approved but on a waitlist due to insufficient program funding at current 
                                                 
7 In addition to PV systems, small wind turbines, fuel cells using renewable fuels, and solar thermal electricity 
systems – all sized to generate less than 200% of the site’s electricity needs on an annual basis – are eligible for the 
program.  To date, PV systems have accounted for roughly 99% of all funded systems.  For more information, see 
http://www.consumerenergycenter.org/erprebate/index.html. 
8 For certain periods of time, customers of publicly-owned utilities have also been eligible to participate. 
9 Additional systems have been completed and approved since April 2005.  We use dated information here to be 
consistent with the dataset used in the subsequent analysis. 
10 The CEC’s program was evaluated in 2000, and among other things, that evaluation found little reduction in 
installed costs for smaller solar systems over the program’s first two years, but sizable cost reductions for larger 
systems (RER 2000).  
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incentive levels.11  Compared to the CEC’s program, a larger number of SGIP applications are 
either rejected or withdrawn, with an average drop-out rate of roughly 45%.12
 
Figure 2 depicts the historical demand for PV within each program through early- to mid-2005, 
shown in terms of the number of megawatts of PV applying for rebates over time.  Quarterly 
application activity within the CEC’s program was slow until the electricity crisis hit in 
2000/2001 (the crisis was also the impetus for establishing the CPUC’s program).  Starting in 
2003, volatility in quarterly applications within the CEC’s program reflects, in large part, last-
minute surges in the number of applications just prior to the regularly scheduled reduction in 
incentive levels every six months, on the first day of January and July.13
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Figure 2.  Quarterly and Cumulative Rebate Application History (CEC and CPUC) 
 
Over time, both the CPUC and the CEC programs have altered the structure and size of their 
incentives for PV installations (see Figure 3).  The CPUC initiated its incentives at $4.5/WAC, 
capped at 50% of pre-rebate installed costs, and dropped the incentive level to $3.5/WAC with no 
percentage cap on December 16, 2004; the CPUC further reduced the incentive to $2.8/WAC for 
applications received after December 15, 2005.  The CEC’s standard incentive started at $3/WAC 
with a 50% incentive cap, increased during the energy crisis to $4.5/WAC, and has then declined 
progressively in recent years to its current level of $2.8/WAC.  The percentage cap was eliminated 
in February 2003.  Affordable housing, solar schools, and owner-installed installations, as well 
as larger systems, have – at various times – received different incentive levels and percentage 
caps.  
                                                 
11 In late 2005, the CPUC decided to dramatically increase SGIP program funding for 2006 in part to help fund 
waitlisted projects.  
12 A large number of impact and process evaluation reports have been prepared for the SGIP (see, e.g., Itron 2003, 
2004, 2005a; RER 2003).  These reports often discuss pre-rebate installed costs, but do not analyze cost trends in 
any detail.  
13 The volatile pattern exhibited in 2003 and 2004 is not evident in the second quarter of 2005, because in Figure 2, 
the second quarter of 2005 is a partial quarter (running only through April 15).  Furthermore, the CEC decided to 
forego the regularly scheduled reduction in incentive levels on July 1, 2005, leaving the rebate at $2.8/WAC for the 
entire year. 
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Figure 3.  Evolution of the Standard Rebates for the CEC and CPUC Programs 
 
In addition to these rebate programs, other policies supporting PV in California include:  net 
metering requirements, simplified interconnection standards, exemptions of solar systems from 
certain utility fees (specifically, “standby” and “exit” fees), and an exemption of PV systems 
from state property taxes.  California has also provided a state income tax credit (ITC) for 
systems 200 kW or smaller, which was as high as 15% from January 2001 through December 
2003, dropping to 7.5% from January 2004 through December 2005.  With highly “tiered” rate 
structures, and time-of-use rates available to some customers, PV electricity in some cases 
offsets retail electricity rates of more than $0.20/kWh.   
 
Finally, the federal government has allowed commercial systems an attractive five-year 
accelerated depreciation schedule and a federal ITC of 10%, which increased to 30% on January 
1, 2006 (and will remain at 30% through 2007, unless extended).  Residential systems are also 
eligible for a 30% federal ITC (capped at $2000) in calendar years 2006 and 2007 (unless 
extended). 
 
2.3 Market Concerns  
Several pertinent concerns have been expressed about the California solar programs, some of 
which will be informed by the analysis presented in this report.  
 
Some have questioned whether current (or even possibly future) funding commitments are (or 
will be) sufficient to drive PV system costs down to competitive levels in a reasonable period of 
time.  Recent increases in the cost of silicon and therefore solar cells, modules, and installations 
have added some weight to these concerns, though most believe that the current silicon shortage 
will be temporary and that PV module costs will continue their march downward within several 
years (Rogel 2005).  It is also important to keep in mind that silicon and PV module costs are 
determined in a worldwide market that is largely outside of the influence of California’s PV 
programs, while installation and balance of system (i.e., non-module) costs may be largely 
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determined at the local level, and are therefore subject to the influence of local PV programs.  As 
such, trends in total system installed costs are arguably a less-appropriate measure of program 
success than are trends in non-module (or balance of system) installed costs.14
 
Others have noted the historical lack of continuity and stability in the existing programs, 
illustrated in Figure 2 by the notable variability and gaps in quarterly incentive applications, and 
driven by changes in the incentive levels and availability of funds.  This lack of certainty may 
lower investor confidence in the California market, and limit efficiencies in manufacturing and 
distribution, thereby compromising the ability of the program to achieve cost reductions (Osborn 
et al. 2005; Steigelmann et al. 2005).  The state’s energy agencies apparently agree with this 
contention, writing jointly: “California policies are clearly supportive of the on-grid solar market, 
but that support was unevenly distributed and often unavailable.” (CEC and CPUC 2005).   
 
There have also been some misgivings about the size and structure of the incentive programs 
themselves.  For example, some have questioned whether the size of the incentives has (at times) 
been so large as to compromise the willingness of installers to lower total installed prices for 
customers (Osborn et al. 2005; CEC 2005).  Others have expressed the view that when the size 
of the CEC and CPUC’s rebates were limited to a certain percentage of pre-rebate installed costs, 
the existence of those percentage caps may have dampened incentives for system cost reductions.  
As an example, under a binding 50% cap, every $1 in cost reduction will reduce the incentive 
payment by $0.5, meaning that the customer captures only 50% of the cost savings.  Likewise, 
the customer will pay only 50% of any cost increase.  So although in theory a percentage cap can 
help to prevent over-subsidization and can reduce the need to regularly adjust fixed rebate levels 
in response to system cost changes, the specific mechanics of the percentage cap do not provide 
a strong incentive for cost reductions, and – even more vexing – do provide opportunities for 
gaming of the program (Bolinger and Wiser 2003; RER 2003).15  Finally, some have wondered 
whether the state should place more emphasis on certain PV applications where cost 
competitiveness may be more readily achieved; for example, incorporating PV systems into new 
building construction, where design and installation efficiencies may help lower customer costs.  
 
At least some of these concerns have already been, or are in the process of being, addressed. The 
CEC eliminated the percentage cap on its rebates in February 2003, and the CPUC followed suit 
in December 2004 (see Figure 3, above).  Meanwhile, Gov. Schwarzenegger has announced his 
support for the California Million Solar Roofs initiative, with a goal of encouraging 3,000 MW 
of new solar PV systems through a long-term, sustained, declining incentive program.  The 
                                                 
14 In Sections 4-6 we present evidence showing that most of the recent cost reductions in California’s PV markets (at 
least for smaller systems) have come from non-module costs, though our analysis is not robust enough to conclude 
that such cost reductions have been caused by California’s PV programs. 
15 Gaming opportunities range from the relatively straightforward “gold-plating” of systems with expensive features, 
knowing that the rebate program will pick up half of the incremental cost, to much more nefarious schemes.  As an 
example of the latter, there have been anecdotal reports of installers artificially pricing systems (that, for example, 
actually cost $8/W) at $9/W in order to maximize the dollar amount of the rebate ($4.5/W, capped at 50% of eligible 
costs), and then sharing the ill-gotten incremental rebate with the system purchaser, to the financial benefit of both 
purchaser and installer.  In this light, it is interesting to note that 30% of all PV systems funded by the CPUC during 
the period in which the 50% cap was in place were priced from $8.75-$9.25/WAC (50% were priced from $8-
$9.25/WAC).  The corresponding numbers in the four-month period of our sample after the cap was dropped (in mid-
December 2004) are 5% and 11.5%, respectively, with the entire cost distribution having shifted to the left (i.e., 
toward lower costs). 
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CPUC – in conjunction with the CEC – is developing an implementation plan for this initiative, 
and on January 12, 2006 approved the outlines of such a program.  The program will place some 
new emphasis on the residential new construction market (through incentives offered by the 
CEC), though not to the exclusion of retrofit markets, and is envisioned to be sizable (~$3.2 
billion) and stable (~11 years) enough to significantly reduce system costs over time.  Incentive 
levels are slated to drop by an average of at least 10% each year.  Incentives may ultimately vary 
to some degree by system size or market segment, though the CPUC declined to establish such 
differentiated incentives initially (except for low-income and affordable housing projects, which 
will receive higher incentive levels).  A pay-for-performance incentive structure is to be 
explored.  Though many of the details remain to be resolved, this order will dramatically expand 
the PV market in the state.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
Data on installed PV costs and other variables come primarily from the program databases 
provided by the CEC (for systems less than 30 kW) and the CPUC (for systems 30 kW and 
above).  The CEC dataset was provided to us in May 2005, and the CPUC database was updated 
through June 2005.16  Table 1 summarizes the content of each dataset, after the data were cleaned 
and data records with missing entries were eliminated (see Appendix A for more details on our 
data manipulation and cleaning procedures).  
 
Table 1.  Summary Information on the Two Final Datasets 
 CEC CPUC 
System Size Range 0.024 kW – 30 kW* 25 kW** – 1,063 kW 
System Cost Restriction $4/WAC – $30/WAC $4/WAC – $30/WAC
Systems Eliminated Due to Cost Restriction 85 (0.5 MW) 4 (1.3 MW) 
System Status for Those Included in Final Dataset   
 Completed 12,856  (48.5 MW) 327   (35.7 MW) 
 Approved  5,033  (24.3 MW) 464   (73.4 MW) 
 Waitlisted          0  (00.0 MW)    262   (71.7 MW)
 TOTAL 17,889  (72.8 MW) 1,053 (180.8 MW) 
Application Date Range 03/20/98 – 04/15/05 07/23/01 – 04/15/05 
Completion Date Range 04/08/98 – 04/07/05 06/18/02 – 05/17/05 
* The CEC program initially funded systems over 30 kW in size, but ceased providing funding to such systems in 
March 2003.  We exclude these larger systems from our analysis (a total of 66 systems, and 9.1 MW of capacity) to 
ensure that a limited number of outliers do not unduly affect our analysis results. 
** Although the CPUC program rules state that only systems of at least 30 kW in size are eligible, the CPUC 
database does contain a few systems less than 30 kW (and as low as 25 kW). 
 
Our final cleaned CEC dataset covers a total of 17,889 data records (72.8 MWAC), including 
12,856 completed systems (48.5 MWAC) and 5,033 systems that had been approved for a rebate, 
but that were awaiting completion at the time we received the database (24.3 MWAC).17  The data 
include rebate applications received from March 1998 to April 2005, and project completion 
dates of April 1998 to April 2005.  To minimize the possible influence of outliers, our analysis 
only includes systems under 30 kW in size, and with costs in the range of $4 to $30/WAC.18      
 
The CPUC program generally covers systems of at least 30 kW in size (though a small number 
of systems are marked as under this size range in the database that we received), and our final 
                                                 
16 More recent data are now available from both programs, and future analysis should use these updated data. 
17 We do not include systems whose rebate applications were declined, or whose application was approved but 
subsequently cancelled. 
18 Systems with costs outside of this range likely represent data entry errors, or atypically cheap or expensive 
systems.  Different reasonable system cost restrictions were tested, with limited effect on regression results.   
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dataset includes 1,053 data records (180.8 MWAC), including 327 completed systems (35.7 
MWAC), 464 approved systems (73.4 MWAC), and 262 waitlisted systems (71.7 MWAC).  
Applications were received from July 2001 to April 2005, and systems have completion dates 
from June 2002 to May 2005.  As with the CEC data, to mitigate the possible influence of 
outliers, our analysis only includes systems with costs in the range of $4-$30/WAC.19   
 
3.2 Variables 
In all cases, the dependent variable is the pre-rebate per-unit total installed cost of individual PV 
systems, in $/WAC, calculated by dividing total pre-rebate installed costs by system size.20  For 
completed systems, this cost figure represents actual costs as reported to rebate program 
administrators.  For approved or waitlisted systems, the cost represents an approximation of 
actual costs provided upon rebate application; because costs are often established by contract 
prior to the submission of a rebate application, these costs are considered relatively firm.  All 
dollar values are translated into real 2004$, using historical monthly CPI data (seasonally 
adjusted).  System size is denominated in WAC, which equates to module WDC-PTC (DC Watts at 
PVUSA test conditions) multiplied by the inverter efficiency rating.21  Note that many other 
solar programs and data sources use WDC-STC (DC Watts at standard test conditions), making 
comparisons of California data with those in other states somewhat more difficult.  
 
A more appropriate dependent variable would be one that accounts for system performance – 
i.e., $/kWh rather than $/W.  This metric would enable us to, for example, normalize the 
additional cost of a tracking system used to enhance system performance.  Because system 
performance data are not regularly collected by the CEC or CPUC programs, however, we were 
forced to use the “second-best” choice of dependent variable, $/WAC.22
 
Table 2 identifies and defines the independent variables used for each dataset, while Table 3 
provides summary statistics; for more information on variable definition, and on our data 
manipulation and data cleaning procedures, see Appendix A. 
 
• Date of Application:  Both datasets include a variable for the date of rebate application, in 
months.  One would generally expect that pre-rebate installed costs would decline with time 
due to manufacturing improvements and distribution channel efficiencies.  Though this 
variable does allow us to track cost changes over time, it is important to note that we are 
unable to test whether the CEC and CPUC programs caused these cost reductions.  To test 
                                                 
19 Different system cost restrictions were tested, with some impact on regression results.  With no easy way of 
determining which cost range was objectively “right,” we opted to maintain consistency with the CEC dataset.   
20 Though California’s PV programs will support systems with battery back-up, the extra costs of such back-up are 
not eligible for incentive payments.  Costs reported here represent “eligible costs,” excluding any costs for battery 
back-up. 
21 The approach used to calculate inverter efficiencies has changed over the course of the rebate programs.  The data 
presented here for system size are based on the inverter efficiency ratings used at the time of system rebate 
application.  An analysis of inverter efficiency ratings over time shows little change in average ratings (less than 1%, 
on average), so changes in rating methodologies should not be a major source of error in the results presented later.   
22 Future work might also explore using customer demand (e.g., applications received) as the dependent variable to 
evaluate the determinants of demand for solar PV systems.  
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for such causation would require cost data from a control market in which state incentives are 
not provided (or are provided at lower levels than in California).23       
• System Size:  Both datasets also include a variable for system size.  With presumed 
economies of scale and installation, larger systems are expected to come in at lower costs.   
• Policy-Based Variables:  Though one might hope that the size of policy incentives would 
have no impact on pre-rebate installed costs, it is possible that the positive impact of these 
incentives on the economics of a solar PV system might dampen the motivation for system 
installers to aggressively reduce pre-rebate installed costs.  Policy variables incorporated in 
the CEC dataset include the level of the rebate, the existence of a percentage cap, the level of 
the state tax credit, and the utility-specific applicable retail electricity rate.24  Similar 
variables were tested on the CPUC dataset, but for reasons discussed later, our final model 
runs only include as policy variables the level of the state tax credit, the utility-specific retail 
rate, and whether particular installations had access to other sizable financial incentives 
(most prominently, incentives offered by a local utility that are, to some degree, additional to 
the incentives offered by the CPUC; similar data were not provided by the CEC).     
• System Installation Status:  Dummy variables for approved (CEC and CPUC) and waitlisted 
(CPUC) systems are included, to test for any systematic variations in system costs between 
completed systems, and approved and waitlisted systems.   
• System Location:  Dummy variables for the location of the system (defined by utility service 
territory) are included to test for any systematic differences in installed costs in these 
territories, relative to systems located in PG&E’s service area.  We have no hypothesis as to 
why costs might differ by utility service territory, other than the potential impact of 
differences in cost of living or retail rates (each of which is addressed through its own 
separate variable). 
• Installation Type:  Four non-overlapping dummy variables for various system installation 
types are included to test for differences in pre-rebate installed costs, relative to systems 
installed in standard residential or commercial retrofit applications.  These variables are only 
possible for the CEC dataset, and include systems installed: (1) in bulk in large, new-home 
residential developments; (2) in single new homes or small clustered new-home 
developments; (3) as part of an affordable housing project; or (4) on a school.  One would 
expect that systems installed in bulk in new construction (large residential development, and 
affordable housing) would come in at lower costs.  
• Installer and Retailer Experience and Type:  A number of dummy variables are included to 
test for the impact of installer and retailer experience, and type.  For the CEC dataset, the 
available data allow us to test for the impact of installer experience and retailer experience on 
pre-rebate system prices, and to test for whether owner-installed systems are more or less 
expensive than contractor-installed systems.  The CPUC dataset allows us to test for the 
impact of installer experience; we also include a dummy variable for systems installed by the 
California Construction Authority (effectively, an owner-installer) because on visual 
                                                 
23 We recommend that future work evaluate PV costs across multiple markets to test for such effects. 
24 Because our retail rate variable is constructed from average retail rates, and therefore only indirectly accounts for 
the highly tiered rate structures facing most Californians, it is far from perfect (for more information on the 
construction of this variable, see Appendix A).  Future work that more accurately characterizes and quantifies the 
specific retail rate that will be displaced by each PV system would be beneficial. 
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inspection of the data it was clear that these systems have been substantially less expensive 
than the more common contractor-installed systems in the CPUC dataset.25  
• Population Density:  Population density, by zip code, was included for the CEC dataset 
(missing zip codes did not allow us to replicate this variable for the CPUC dataset).  One 
might expect that system costs would be lower in more densely populated areas due to the 
existence of PV supplier competition; on the other hand, these areas may experience higher 
costs because of the typically higher cost-of-living in urban areas and the impact of those 
costs on installation labor expenses.   
• Thin Film:  Both datasets have a dummy variable for systems using thin-film PV 
technology, a less common but potentially less-expensive PV technology than crystalline 
silicon.   
• Module Cost Index:  Pre-rebate installed costs are also expected to vary based on the 
prevailing cost of PV modules, measured here as an annual average of global module prices, 
and ultimately included only for the CEC dataset.26 
 
Several additional variables were also explored, without success.  Of most relevance, we 
constructed and tested a variable for cumulative program-related PV installations, under the 
assumption that non-module system costs might follow a state- or program-specific learning 
curve (due, for example, to reductions in installation costs with installation experience).  We 
found this variable to be somewhat collinear with time, however, and a linear representation of 
time fit our underlying data far better than cumulative PV additions, at least for the CEC 
dataset.27  We also explored and tested several different representations of installation supply 
constraints, under the assumption that PV costs could rise at times when the installation 
infrastructure is strained.  Despite several attempts, we were unable to construct a successful 
variable to measure these possible effects.    
 
                                                 
25 The California Construction Authority (CCA) is a Joint Powers Authority organized in August 1988 to provide 
financing, design, inspection and construction management services for fairgrounds throughout California.  The low 
cost of the CCA systems is perhaps partially attributable to bulk equipment purchases for multiple fairground 
projects.  Some have also speculated that the CCA is able to install systems at lower costs than the PV industry at 
large due to the fact that it has no marketing, sales, or overhead costs (and/or that certain internal costs are not 
reported).  In other words, CCA-installed systems in the CPUC program are essentially the equivalent of owner-
installed systems in the CEC program. 
26 Although the CEC database does, in some cases, contain disaggregated information on module, inverter, and labor 
costs, this information is only sparsely reported (and the CPUC database does not provide such information at all).  
As a result, we have used an external index of worldwide module costs over time from Strategies Unlimited to proxy 
module costs for each California system. 
27 More generally, using global photovoltaic price trends, Papineau (2006) finds that the addition of a time variable 
to a model that also includes cumulative production generally makes the cumulative production variable statistically 
insignificant, leading to questions over the predictive power of experience curves more generally.  
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Table 2.  Independent Variables Used in Analysis 
Datasets Name 
CEC CPUC 
Definition 
TIME_MONTH U U Date of application, in months, numbered consecutively from beginning of each program* 
SYSTEM_SIZE U U Size of installation (WAC) 
MAX_STD_REBATE U Tried/Failed Maximum standard rebate (2004 $/WAC)** 
REBATE_%_CAP U Tried/Failed 1 if rebate has a percentage cap 
STATE_TAX_CREDIT U U 0, 7.5%, 15% state ITC depends on time of application, and system size 
RETAIL_RATES U U 
A function of system size (to determine whether residential 
or commercial retail rates are appropriate) and location (to 
determine applicable utility).  See Appendix A for details. 
OTHER_INCENTIVES  U 1 if other incentives are greater than $2/WAC
APPROVED U U 1 if approved, but not completed  
WAITLISTED  U 1 if waitlisted, but not completed   
SCE U U 1 if in SCE’s territory  
SDG&E U U 1 if in SDG&E’s territory  
OTHER_UTILITY U U 1 if in another territory*** 
NEW_CONST_LARGE U  1 if installed with many other systems as part of a large new residential development 
NEW_CONST_SINGLE U  1 if installed on a single new home, or as part of a small cluster of new homes  
SCHOOLS U  1 if installed at a school  
AFFORDABLE_HOUSING U  1 if installed as part of an affordable housing project  
OWNER_INSTALLED U  1 if installed by owner  
INSTALLER_EXPERIENCE U U 1 for installers in the top 5% of installation companies in terms of aggregate installations over course of program  
RETAILER_EXPERIENCE U  1 for retailers in the top 5% of retailers in terms of aggregate installations over course of program 
CALIF_CONST_AUTORITY  U 1 for systems installed by California Construction Authority 
POPULATION_DENSITY U  By zip code, population divided by geographic area (person/miles2) 
THIN_FILM U U 1 if system includes thin-firm PV modules 
MODULE_COST_INDEX U Tried/Failed 
Annual index of global PV module prices in the power 
sector (2004 $/WDC-STC) 
* We use the date of application (rather than completion) under the presumption that system costs are largely set, by 
contract, prior to the submission of a rebate application.  
** This variable accounts for changes in standard rebates over time, but not non-standard rebates that have been 
provided for affordable housing, schools, and owner-installed systems 
*** For the CEC data, other utility territories include:  Sacramento (SMUD), Bear Valley Electric Service, Palo 
Alto, and 13 smaller publicly-owned utilities with just a few systems each.  For the CPUC data, they include Los 
Angeles (LADWP), Sacramento (SMUD), and 14 smaller publicly-owned utilities with just a few systems each. 
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Table 3.  Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Analysis 
CEC (< 30 kW) CPUC (>= 30 kW) 
Continuous  Variables 
Mean Max Min Std. Dev. Mean Max Min Std. Dev.
INSTALLED_COST 9.6 29.3 4.1 2.2 8.8 23.7 4.4 1.6 
TIME_MONTH 62.4 85.0 0.0 14.6 32.9 45.0 0.0 11.1 
SYSTEM_SIZE 4.1 30.0 0.0 3.7 171.7 1,063 24.6 223.6 
MAX_STD_REBATE 3.9 4.8 2.7 0.7 4.2 4.8 3.4 0.6 
STATE_TAX_CREDIT 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.05 
RETAIL_RATES 0.13 0.19 0.08 0.01 0.13 0.16 0.05 0.02 
MODULE_COST_INDEX 3.5 4.5 3.3 0.2 3.5 3.9 3.3 0.1 
POPULATION_DENSITY 2,629 52,959 0.25 4,147 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Dummy Variables 
Observations 
(Dummy = 1) 
Percent 
of Total 
Observations 
(Dummy = 1) 
Percent 
of Total 
REBATE_%_CAP 5,193 29% 678 64% 
OTHER_INCENTIVES n/a n/a 56 5% 
APPROVED* 5,033 28% 464 44% 
WAITLISTED* n/a n/a 262 25% 
SCE** 3,706 21% 294 28% 
SDG&E** 3,247 18% 151 14% 
OTHER_UTILITY** 139 1% 113 11% 
NEW_CONST_LARGE† 1,946 11% n/a n/a 
NEW_CONST_SMALL† 771 4% n/a n/a 
SCHOOLS† 60 0% n/a n/a 
AFFORDABLE_HOUSING† 340 2% n/a n/a 
OWNER_INSTALLED 862 5% n/a n/a 
INSTALLER_EXPERIENCE 9,454 53% 257 24% 
RETAILER_EXPERIENCE 6,152 34% n/a n/a 
CALIF_CONST_AUTHORITY n/a n/a 16 2% 
THIN_FILM 318 2% 111 11% 
* In addition to approved and waitlisted systems, the CEC and CPUC datasets include 12,856 and 327 completed 
systems, respectively. 
** PG&E, which represents the “base” utility territory to which the others are compared, contains the majority of 
systems: 10,797 (60%) systems in the CEC dataset, and 495 (47%) systems in the CPUC dataset.28
† Standard retrofits represent the “base” type of system to which others are compared in the CEC dataset, and 
include 14,772 total systems (83%).  
 
 
                                                 
28 The datasets do not easily allow us to hypothesize and test why PG&E appears to host a disproportional (at least 
relative to load) share of PV systems. 
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3.3 Methodology 
Analysis was conducted using multivariate regression techniques, with the dependent variable 
the per-unit, pre-rebate installed cost ($/WAC).29  White’s Test showed the presence of 
heteroscedasticity (non-constant variance in the error structure) in a number of our ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression results; accordingly, we consistently present corrected standard errors 
using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in the results that follow.  
 
We also explored the possibility of colinearity among independent variables, both by reviewing 
correlation coefficients and by sequentially adding or subtracting variables to test for correlated 
effects.  In some cases, variables with significant colinearity were eliminated.  As discussed 
below, we also developed a separate regression model that includes a subset of these collinear 
variables where complete variable elimination did not seem prudent.   
 
Various functional forms were tested for the continuous independent variables.  For many, we 
ultimately use a simple linear form.  We use a logarithmic form for SYSTEM_SIZE because, 
upon visual inspection and after statistical tests, that functional form appeared to fit our 
underlying data better than the alternatives that we tested.  The square root of 
POPULATION_DENSITY is used because it fits the data well, and because it is assumed that 
changes in density in sparsely populated areas will have a greater affect than similar changes in 
density in more-densely populated urban areas.  We also tested alternative functional forms for 
the TIME_MONTH month, but none outperformed a simple linear model.   
 
After testing a considerable number of alternative regression models, we developed four final 
models for both the CEC and the CPUC datasets: 
 
• Model 1 includes many of the independent variables listed earlier, but excludes the 
MODULE_COST_INDEX and the MAX_STD_REBATE variables.  By excluding these 
variables, both of which are correlated with time, this model provides the best representation 
of aggregate cost reductions with time. (This model, as well as models 2 and 4, also excludes 
REBATE_%_CAP, STATE_TAX_CREDIT, and RETAIL_RATES). 
• Model 2 is equivalent to Model 1, but includes the MODULE_COST_INDEX and 
MAX_STD_REBATE variables, allowing an evaluation of the impact of the rebate on pre-
rebate system costs, as well as an assessment of non-module cost reductions over time.  
• Model 3 is equivalent to Model 2, but adds three additional variables that experience some 
colinearity among themselves and with other independent variables, but that have policy 
interest:  REBATE_%_CAP, STATE_TAX_CREDIT, and RETAIL_RATES. 
• Model 4 contains the same independent variables as Model 2, but includes a large number of 
crossed terms to determine whether the coefficients of certain variables included in other 
models are affected by time or by system size.  The crossed variables include 
DATE_MONTH, NEW_CONST_LARGE, NEW_CONST_SMALL, 
                                                 
29 We also explored using pre-rebate total installed cost as the dependent variable (2004 $), as opposed to per-unit 
pre-rebate installed costs (2004 $/WAC).  The resulting total cost regression models explained a far greater fraction 
of total cost variation (i.e., had a much higher R2, of around 0.9), but we chose to focus on the lower-R2 per-unit cost 
results because they do not require a transformation of regression results to present the more intuitive and policy-
relevant per-unit cost results.  
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OWNER_INSTALLED, INSTALLER_EXPERIENCE, RETAILER_EXPERIENCE, 
POPULATION_DENSITY, and THIN_FILM (the CPUC dataset does not contain many of 
these variables, and so includes fewer crossed terms).  
 
Each of these models was applied to:  (1) just the completed PV systems, (2) to “pooled” data 
including both completed and approved systems, and (3) in the case of the CPUC dataset, to 
pooled data including completed, approved, and waitlisted systems.  Though some differences in 
regression results exist depending on which dataset was used, they are not substantial.  The 
results that follow therefore emphasize the fully pooled datasets (i.e., completed and approved 
systems for the CEC; completed, approved, and waitlisted systems for the CPUC).  For reference 
purposes, Appendix C presents regression results for just the completed systems.  
 
Though we present results from all four models for both the CPUC and CEC pooled datasets, 
Model 2 was unsuccessful when applied to the CPUC SGIP data:  coefficients for 
MODULE_COST_INDEX and the MAX_STD_REBATE were sometimes of opposite sign 
from what we expected, and colinearity was a clear problem. After numerous attempts, we were 
unsuccessful in rectifying this problem.  We therefore place little emphasis on Model 2 results 
for the CPUC dataset.  For a similar reason, we excluded the REBATE_%_CAP variable from 
the CPUC’s Model 3 results.  The unfortunate result of these exclusions is that the CPUC models 
provide substantially less policy richness than the CEC’s models.   
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4. Analysis Results:  CEC Systems Under 30 kW in Size 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
Figures 4 through 8 show in graphical format some of the potential relationships between pre-
rebate installed cost (in 2004 $/WAC) and a subset of the potential explanatory variables 
described in Section 3.  The figures use the pooled CEC dataset of PV systems under 30 kW in 
size, including both completed and approved systems.   
 
The overall average pre-rebate installed cost of the CEC systems is $9.6/WAC (2004 $), which 
equates to approximately $8.0/WDC-STC (assuming a 0.84 de-rating).  A review of the bivariate 
relationships portrayed in Figures 4 and 5 suggest that average installed costs exhibit some 
economies of scale, most pronounced in systems less than 10 kW in size, and that average 
installed costs – over all system sizes – have generally declined over time.   
 
In particular, Figure 4 shows that over the course of the program, average system costs for 
installations under 2 kW have been more than $10.5/WAC (2004 $), while systems over 10 kW 
have had average costs of roughly $8.5/WAC (2004 $).  Meanwhile, Figure 5 shows that average 
pre-rebate installed costs (in 2004 $) have declined substantially over time (where time is 
expressed in half-year intervals), from more than $12/WAC in the initial year of the program to 
less than $9/WAC for the more recent installations.   
 
Some of this cost decline is due to a reduction in high-cost outliers.  For example, from 1998 
through 2000, 14% of systems had costs greater than $4/W above the average system cost at that 
time.  In 2004 and 2005, just 1% of systems had costs more than $4/W above the average system 
cost.  This reduction in outliers is not surprising, and likely reflects a maturing PV market in 
which price competition is increasing over time.  However, as shown by the cost distributions 
presented in Appendix B, the overall cost reductions are due not just to a narrowing of the cost 
range, but also to a shift of the distribution towards lower-cost systems.    
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Figure 6 depicts many of the cost relationships revealed by our use of dummy variables.  Though 
these bivariate results do not control for the impact of other variables, many of the relationships 
shown in Figure 6 (e.g., systems installed in new home construction and affordable housing 
costing less than retrofitted systems, owner-installed systems costing less than contractor-
installed systems, etc.) are generally consistent with those revealed through the multivariate 
regression results, as presented in the next section. 
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Finally, Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the influence of module costs, non-module costs, and rebates 
on average pre-rebate total installed costs over time (with time expressed in half-year intervals).  
Specifically, Figure 7 shows a tight relationship between standard rebate levels and average pre-
rebate installed costs, particularly since mid-2000, with pre-rebate installed costs following 
rebate levels both higher (in 2001) and then gradually lower (starting in 2003).  The average cost 
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to the PV customer has remained more or less constant since 2001, with some modest increase in 
customer costs since the end of 2003.   
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1
(n = 34)
2
(76)
1
(106)
2
(92)
1
(70)
2
(122)
1
(989)
2
(1,251)
1
(1,123)
2
(1,330)
1
(3,359)
2
(3,594)
1
(3,333)
2
(2,181)
1
(229)
20
04
 $
/W
AC
 (M
ea
n)
 Total Cost
 Standard Rebate
 Customer Cost
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Figure 7.  Impact of Standard Rebate Level on Average Installed Cost (CEC) 
 
As shown in Figure 8, reductions in average total pre-rebate installed costs over time have been 
largely driven by reductions in non-module costs.  Module costs (represented here by a generic 
module cost index – not by actual application data on module costs) have declined somewhat 
over the course of the CEC’s program, but non-module costs have dropped significantly, from 
roughly $8/WAC (2004 $) during the initial years of the program to just over $5/WAC (2004 $) 
more recently.  This trend in non-module costs is encouraging, and is perhaps the most that an 
individual PV program can hope to achieve given that module costs are set in a worldwide 
market and are therefore heavily influenced by factors outside of the control of the local program 
(e.g., demand for PV in Japan and Germany).  As noted earlier, however, we are unable to prove 
conclusively that the reductions in non-module costs in California have been caused by the 
state’s incentive programs absent analysis of non-module cost trends in other control markets. 
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4.2 Regression Results 
The bivariate relationships shown above are intriguing, but regression analysis is required to 
control for the influence of other factors.  Table 4 summarizes regression results for the four 
basic models specified earlier, as applied to the pooled CEC dataset for systems under 30 kW in 
size.  Although these regressions only explain a fraction of the overall variance in the data (R2 of 
0.29 to 0.32), a large proportion of the independent variables have statistically significant 
(defined here as at least 90% significance, or p-values of less than 0.10) impacts on pre-rebate 
installed costs.  Most of these relationships support the hypotheses reported earlier, and are 
consistent with corresponding regressions applied to just the CEC’s completed PV systems (see 
Appendix C).  There remains a significant amount of unexplained variation in the underlying 
data, however, suggesting that PV costs are impacted by a number of variables not included in 
our analysis30 and/or that there is simply a considerable amount of unexplainable noise in PV 
system costs that may reflect an immature market in which price competition is not robust.  
 
4.2.1 The Impact of Time, Average Module Cost, and System Status 
Model 1 results (see Table 4) show that, with each successive monthly period, an average cost 
reduction of $0.058/WAC (all data reported here will be in 2004 $) has been experienced, 
equating to an annual reduction of approximately $0.70/WAC.  At the mean system cost of 
$9.6/WAC, this represents a 7.3% annual reduction in pre-rebate installed costs, significantly 
outpacing the 2.6% average annual inflation rate over the approximately seven year period 
covered by the data (implying that prices have fallen in nominal terms as well).   
 
Some of this decline is due to a decrease in the average cost of PV modules over the course of 
the program (notwithstanding recent increases in those costs – see Figure 8).  Pre-rebate system 
costs may also be affected by changing rebate levels over time (see Figure 7).  Model 2 includes 
independent variables that control for these influences, and the regression results show that even 
considering these effects, pre-rebate non-module system costs have dropped by an average of 
approximately $0.025/WAC each month, or $0.30/WAC each year.  At the mean system cost, this 
non-module cost reduction is 3.1% per year, still exceeding (to a limited extent) the average 
impact of inflation on nominal costs over the seven-year time period.  
 
Model 4, by including crossed terms, helps to illuminate how system size has influenced cost 
reductions over time.  In particular, the coefficient for the variable DATE_MONTH x LN_SIZE 
indicates that larger systems have – on average – experienced a smaller drop in costs over time 
than have smaller systems.  Applying this coefficient, a 10 kW PV system would experience an 
annual reduction in costs that is roughly $0.20/WAC less than that of a 2 kW system.  That costs 
are dropping more rapidly for smaller systems should perhaps come as little surprise:  with a 
greater fraction of costs used for labor and balance-of-systems, smaller PV systems may have the 
most to gain from distribution and installation channel efficiencies.   
 
 
                                                 
30 For example, the low resolution of the data prohibited us from distinguishing between different product types that 
can have widely varying costs – e.g., roof-mounted systems vs. tracking systems vs. systems structured as carports.   
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Table 4.  Regression Results for CEC Dataset (PV Systems < 30 kW)  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Variable 
coef. p Coef. p coef. p coef. p 
INTERCEPT 19.921 <0.01 11.562 <0.01 12.334 <0.01 14.202 <0.01
TIME_MONTH -0.058 <0.01 -0.025 <0.01 -0.026 <0.01 -0.100 <0.01
LN_SYSTEM_SIZE -0.846 <0.01 -0.853 <0.01 -0.856 <0.01 -1.411 <0.01
APPROVED 0.258 <0.01 0.377 <0.01 0.357 <0.01 0.257 <0.01
SCE -0.098 <0.01 -0.101 <0.01 -0.109 <0.01 -0.081 0.02 
SDG&E -0.291 <0.01 -0.336 <0.01 -0.308 <0.01 -0.366 <0.01
OTHER_UTILITY -2.126 <0.01 -2.436 <0.01 -2.518 <0.01 -2.432 <0.01
NEW_CONST_LARGE -1.188 <0.01 -1.228 <0.01 -1.206 <0.01 -1.353 0.02 
NEW_CONST_SMALL 0.179 <0.01 0.180 <0.01 0.175 <0.01 2.118 0.07 
SCHOOLS 0.285 0.25 0.365 0.14 0.351 0.16 0.216 0.39 
AFFORDABLE_HOUSING -1.925 <0.01 -1.898 <0.01 -1.845 <0.01 -1.791 <0.01
OWNER_INSTALLED -1.755 <0.01 -1.800 <0.01 -1.803 <0.01 -0.686 0.58 
INSTALLER_EXPERIENCE 0.282 <0.01 0.288 <0.01 0.288 <0.01 1.925 <0.01
RETAILER_EXPERIENCE 0.169 <0.01 0.171 <0.01 0.170 <0.01 0.325 0.51 
SQRT_POP_DENSITY 4.2E-03 <0.01 4.2E-03 <0.01 4.2E-03 <0.01 1.9E-02 <0.01
THIN_FILM -0.699 <0.01 -0.732 <0.01 -0.733 <0.01 -5.389 <0.01
MAX_STD_REBATE     0.730 <0.01 0.556 <0.01 0.794 <0.01
MODULE_COST_INDEX     1.008 <0.01 0.906 <0.01 1.218 <0.01
REBATE_%_CAP         0.219 0.08     
STATE_TAX_CREDIT         1.647 <0.01     
RETAIL_RATES         1.151 0.59     
DATE_MONTH x LN_SIZE             0.011 <0.01
NEW_CONST_LARGE x LN_SIZE             -0.685 <0.01
NEW_CONST_SMALL x LN_SIZE             -0.019 0.86 
OWNER_INSTALLED x LN_SIZE             7.2E-03 0.96 
INSTALLER_EXP x LN_SIZE             -0.079 0.16 
RETAILER_EXP x LN_SIZE             0.075 0.18 
SQRT_POP_DENSITY x LN_SIZE             -2.2E-03 <0.01
THIN_FILM x LN_SIZE             0.295 0.26 
NEW_CONST_LARGE x TIME             0.083 <0.01
NEW_CONST_SMALL x TIME             -0.024 <0.01
OWNER_INSTALLED x TIME             -0.020 <0.01
INSTALLER_EXP x TIME             -0.015 <0.01
RETAILER_EXP x TIME             -0.012 <0.01
SQRT_POP_DENSITY x TIME             4.8E-05 0.21 
THIN_FILM x TIME             0.042 <0.01
R-SQUARED 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.32 
OBSERVATIONS (n) 17,889 17,889 17,889 17,889 
 
The module cost index variable is included in Models 2, 3 and 4, and averages near unity in all 
cases (1.01, 0.91, and 1.22).  This is to be expected, and shows that aggregate changes in average 
module costs translate directly into similar-sized changes in pre-rebate system installed costs.   
Approved but not yet completed systems are found to have costs that are on average $0.25-
$0.38/WAC higher than completed systems (depending on the regression run).  The reason for 
this differential is not altogether clear, but may be due to the fact that most of the approved 
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systems in the CEC’s dataset have been recently submitted, during a time in which silicon 
shortages have yielded higher module costs.    
 
4.2.2 Policies and Incentives 
The level and design of the CEC’s rebate also appears to have had a significant impact on pre-
rebate installed costs.  Though the coefficient is somewhat sensitive to model specification (due 
in part to colinearity with other variables), the regression results for MAX_STD_REBATE 
suggest – as does Figure 7 – that pre-rebate installed costs have tracked (to some degree) the 
level of the rebate itself, and that system purchasers have therefore not benefited from the full 
amount of the rebate (with some of it “captured” by system retailers or installers through higher 
prices).31   
 
In particular, we find that each $1/WAC change in the rebate level has, on average, yielded a 
$0.55-0.80/WAC change in pre-rebate installed costs (the range reflects the results of the different 
regression runs for Models 2, 3, and 4).  In other words, when the CEC increased its rebate level 
by $1.5/WAC (from $3/WAC to $4.5/WAC) in early 2001, system purchasers only realized $0.3-
$0.7/WAC of that increase, with the remaining $0.8-$1.2/WAC being “captured” by system 
retailers or installers through correspondingly higher prices.  By the same token, our regression 
results (which do not distinguish between an increase or decrease in rebate levels32) suggest that 
as the CEC has gradually reduced its rebate level since early 2003, system retailers have 
absorbed some of the decrease by reducing prices, thereby leaving the net cost to the system 
purchaser essentially unchanged.  These results are consistent with the bivariate relationships 
presented earlier in Figures 7 and 8. 
 
Though colinearity problems exist for the variables added in Model 3 (REBATE_%_CAP, 
STATE_TAX_CREDIT, and RETAIL_RATES ), regression results provide weak evidence that 
the existence of the percentage rebate cap may also have had some impact on pre-rebate system 
costs.  Model 3 shows that average system costs were roughly $0.20/WAC higher during the 
period in which the percentage cap was in place, than when it was removed.  There is also some 
evidence that the size of the state tax credit may have impacted system costs, with the coefficient 
for STATE_TAX_CREDIT implying that an increase in the credit from 0% to 15% was matched 
with an increase in system installed costs of approximately $0.25/WAC.  We find no statistical 
evidence that retail rates have had an impact on pre-rebate installed costs.33  
 
4.2.3 System Size 
Larger systems are found to be systematically less expensive than smaller systems, with 
LN_SYSTEM_SIZE showing statistically significant and sizable effects.  Compared to a 1 kW 
system, regression results for Model 2 suggest that larger installations have lower costs as 
                                                 
31 Though some might be inclined to read into these results an argument for switching from capacity-based to 
performance-based incentives, we note that there is nothing in our dataset or analysis that allows us to comment on 
the relative superiority of one incentive type over another. 
32 We did test for differential regression results depending on whether MAX_STD_REBATE increased or 
decreased, but were unable to find any significant results. 
33 Though again, our retail rate variable only indirectly accounts for California’s highly tiered rate structure, and 
therefore may not be adequately specified. 
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follows:  3 kW ($0.90/WAC lower); 5 kW ($1.4/WAC lower); 10 kW ($2/WAC lower); and 30 kW 
($2.9/WAC lower).  These results are consistent with the bivariate relationships presented earlier 
in Figure 4, and show that economies of scale are particularly dramatic among smaller systems, 
but diminish somewhat among larger systems (i.e., costs drop by $2/WAC for 10 kW systems 
relative to 1 kW systems, but only drop by an additional $0.90 WAC for 30 kW systems).  
 
4.2.4 Installation Type 
The nature of the installation clearly has had a substantial impact on average pre-rebate installed 
costs.  Systems installed or planned for installation in large new residential developments 
(totaling 1,946 systems) show cost reductions of approximately $1.2/WAC, on average, compared 
to the general retrofit market.  Similarly, the 340 systems used in affordable housing 
applications, which often involve new construction and presumably enable bulk system 
installation, exhibit costs that are $1.9/WAC lower than the general retrofit market, on average.  
These results are directionally consistent with the bivariate relationships shown earlier in Figure 
6.  Systems installed in single new homes (or small clusters) exhibit modestly higher costs of 
approximately $0.18/WAC on average, perhaps due to the custom-designed nature of many of 
these systems, as well as a lack of the economies of scale possible in larger new home 
developments.  Systems installed at schools (of which there are only 60, and most are retrofits) 
do not have statistically significant differences in cost compared to the general retrofit market.   
 
Some of these cost differentials have varied with time and, to a lesser extent, with system size, as 
revealed by the results of Model 4.  The cost savings associated with systems installed in large 
new home developments, for example, are shown to be higher for larger systems, but also to be 
narrowing over time.  This latter finding is consistent with results presented in Appendix C, 
which show that completed large residential development projects have experienced cost savings 
that that have averaged $1.7/WAC, larger than the $1.2/WAC average cost advantage show when 
completed and approved systems are considered together.  The cost disadvantage of systems 
installed individually or in small clusters on new homes has similarly been narrowing with time.  
 
4.2.5 Module Type  
Projects using thin film PV technology – of which there are 318 – are found to have had 
systematically lower costs than those relying on traditional crystalline silicon, with a differential 
of roughly $0.70/WAC on average.  These results are generally consistent with the mean costs 
shown earlier in Figure 6.  Model 4, however, shows that this cost differential has narrowed over 
time:  the coefficient for the THIN_FILM x TIME variable is positive and statistically 
significant.  This trend is also consistent with the regression results presented in Appendix C for 
only completed systems, which reveal that completed systems using thin film technology have 
had costs that are approximately $0.90/WAC lower than those employing crystalline silicon. 
 
4.2.6 Installer/Retailer Type and Experience 
Owner-installed systems (totaling 862 systems, or 5% of our dataset) are found to have 
considerably lower reported costs than contractor-installed systems, with a $1.8/WAC savings on 
average over the course of the CEC’s rebate program.  More-experienced installers and retailers 
are found to charge slightly more for their services, relative to installers and retailers with less 
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experience: approximately $0.29/WAC and $0.17/WAC, respectively.  These results are generally 
consistent with the bivariate relationships depicted earlier in Figure 6. 
 
These differentials have, in some cases, changed with time and system size (see Model 4 results). 
The reported cost savings from owner-installed systems, for example, have increased over time.  
The cost disadvantage associated with more experienced installers and retailers, on the other 
hand, has decreased with time.  There is also some statistical evidence (which is stronger in the 
completed-only regression than in the pooled regression) that installer experience imposes a less 
significant cost disadvantage on larger systems than on smaller ones.    
 
4.2.7 System Location and Population Density  
In comparison to the “base” service territory of PG&E (where 60% of the systems have been 
located), systems installed in other areas report lower pre-rebate costs.  For example, systems 
located in SCE’s service territory are found to be approximately $0.10/WAC cheaper, while 
systems located in SDG&E’s territory have reported roughly $0.30/WAC lower costs, on average.  
Systems sited in other utility territories have reported substantially lower costs still, $2.1-
2.5/WAC below those in PG&E.34  These other territories primarily include public power utilities, 
and the lower costs reported for systems may reflect the presence of other local utility incentives 
that are not tracked by the CEC, or may otherwise reflect local bulk purchase and installation 
programs.  These potential explanations are pure suppositions, however – nothing in our dataset 
or analysis allows us to definitively explain the inter-utility cost differences described above (we 
did try an imperfect measure of utility-specific retail rates, but with little success). 
 
The population density of the location of installation also appears to have some effect on system 
costs, with more densely populated areas experiencing higher average costs.  As an example, the 
regression results suggest that moving from an area with a population density of 500 per square 
mile to one of 7,000 per square mile (the mean population density in our data is 2,600) results in 
an average system cost increase of roughly $0.25/WAC.  Model 4 results further show that this 
cost disadvantage appears to be greater for smaller systems.  This finding is consistent with the 
idea that population density may be a proxy for the cost of living, and therefore labor costs.  One 
would expect smaller systems to generally be more sensitive to labor costs than larger systems, 
because small systems likely require a greater proportionate amount of installation labor.  
 
 
                                                 
34 If one considered just completed systems, as reported in Appendix B, these cost differentials are somewhat larger.  
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5. Analysis Results:  CPUC Systems 30 kW and Above in Size 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
Focusing now on the larger systems (30 kW and above) under the CPUC’s SGIP program, 
Figures 9 through 13 depict some of the potential relationships between pre-rebate installed cost 
and some of the pertinent explanatory variables described in Section 3.  The figures use the 
pooled CPUC dataset including completed, approved, and waitlisted systems.   
 
The overall average pre-rebate installed cost of the CPUC systems is $8.8/WAC (2004 $), which 
equates to approximately $7.4/WDC-STC (assuming a 0.84 de-rating).  A review of the data 
presented in Figure 9 suggests that, as was the case for CEC-funded systems, the average 
installed cost of CPUC-funded systems exhibits economies of scale, most pronounced for 
systems less than 450 kW.  The up tick in average installed costs for systems sized between 60 
and 100 kW is somewhat of an anomaly, being heavily influenced by 59 identical applications 
(out of 209 total applications in this size range), all submitted on the same day, by the same 
installer, and at the same estimated installed cost of $9.82/WAC (2004$).  Overall, the largest 
systems funded by the CPUC’s program have costs that are on average roughly $1/WAC lower 
than the smaller systems funded by this program. 
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Figure 9.  Average Installed Cost, by System Size (CPUC) 
 
In contrast to the longer-running CEC program, which exhibited clear downward cost trends over 
time, costs under the CPUC’s program have been far more flat (or even increasing, and then 
decreasing), as shown in Figure 10, though costs do appear to have declined since 2002.  
Appendix B presents the distribution of these costs, in modified histogram form, and shows that 
the distribution appears to have shifted toward lower-cost systems over time.  
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Figure 10.  Average Installed Cost Over Time (6-Month Intervals), by System Size (CPUC) 
 
Figure 11 depicts many of the cost relationships revealed by our use of dummy variables.  
Though not able to control for other factors, many of the relationships shown in Figure 11 are 
consistent with those revealed through multivariate regression results, as presented in the next 
section. 
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Figure 11.  Average Installed Cost, by System or Installation Type (CPUC) 
 
Finally, Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the influence of module costs, non-module costs, and rebates 
on average pre-rebate total installed costs over time (with time expressed in half-year intervals).  
The relationships depicted here are not as strong as they were under the CEC’s program, perhaps 
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in part because of the relatively short history of the program, coupled with an unwavering rebate 
level over most of that time period.35
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Figure 12.  Impact of Rebate Level on Average Installed Cost (CPUC) 
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Figure 13.  Average Installed Cost Over Time, by Module and Non-Module Costs (CPUC) 
 
5.2 Regression Results 
As with the earlier CEC analysis, Table 5 summarizes our regression results for the fully pooled 
CPUC dataset for the four basic models specified earlier (regression results for just the 
completed systems are reported in Appendix C).  The regressions only explain a fraction of the 
overall variance in the data (R2 of 0.25), and a higher proportion of the independent variables are 
                                                 
35 Our data and analysis are not sufficient to allow us to conclude with certainty the reasons for the differences 
between the CPUC and CEC programs. 
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statistically insignificant (i.e., p-value >0.10) than in the earlier CEC results.  This may be caused 
by the much smaller sample size of the CPUC dataset, or more fundamentally from greater 
“noise” in that dataset.  Nonetheless, a number of the independent variables are significant, and 
many of the relationships support the hypotheses reported earlier. 
 
Table 5.  Regression Results for CPUC Dataset (PV Systems 25 - 1,063 kW)  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Variable 
coef. P coef. p coef. p coef. p 
INTERCEPT 11.258 <0.01 18.565 <0.01 10.753 <0.01 12.022 <0.01 
TIME_MONTH -0.030 <0.01 -0.053 <0.01 -0.026 <0.01 -0.049 0.03 
LN_SYSTEM_SIZE -0.322 <0.01 -0.335 <0.01 -0.232 <0.01 -0.510 <0.01 
APPROVED 0.067 0.69 0.209 0.32 0.077 0.66 0.065 0.71 
WAITLISTED -0.222 0.32 -0.354 0.19 -0.265 0.23 -0.270 0.23 
SCE 0.309 <0.01 0.292 0.01 0.283 0.02 0.282 0.01 
SDG&E 0.486 <0.01 0.501 <0.01 0.400 0.07 0.430 <0.01 
OTHER_UTILITY 0.072 0.69 0.054 0.76 0.009 0.97 0.059 0.74 
OTHER_INCENTIVES 0.626 0.10 0.626 0.09 0.567 0.13 0.676 0.08 
INSTALLER_EXPERIENCE -0.686 <0.01 -0.671 <0.01 -0.673 <0.01 -0.134 0.76 
CALIF_CONST_AUTHORITY -4.028 <0.01 -4.096 <0.01 -4.042 <0.01 -3.649 <0.01 
THIN_FILM 0.183 0.18 0.172 0.23 0.206 0.14 -2.434 <0.01 
MODULE_COST_INDEX     -1.116 0.13         
MAX_STD_REBATE     -0.635 <0.01         
STATE_TAX_CREDIT         3.011 0.06     
RETAIL_RATES         -1.695 0.70     
DATE_MONTH x LN_SIZE             0.005 0.34 
INSTALLER_EXP x LN_SIZE             -0.075 0.37 
THIN_FILM x LN_SIZE             0.450 <0.01 
INSTALLER_EXP x TIME             -0.005 0.61 
THIN_FILM x TIME             0.016 0.26 
R-SQUARED 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
OBSERVATIONS (n) 1,053 1,053 1,053 1,053 
 
5.2.1 The Impact of Time, Average Module Cost, and System Status 
Though Figure 10 does not provide a clear visual trend of declining system costs over time, our 
Model 1 regression results (which control for the impact of other variables) reveals an average 
cost reduction of $0.03/WAC per month (all data reported here will be in 2004 $), equating to an 
annual reduction that has averaged $0.36/WAC.  At the mean system cost of $8.8/WAC, this 
represents a 4.1% annual reduction in pre-rebate installed costs, outpacing the 2.4% average 
inflation rate over the nearly four-year period covered by the data.  Appendix C shows that for 
completed systems, the average cost reductions have been slightly larger at $0.44/WAC per year. 
 
These yearly cost declines are substantially smaller than those for the CEC dataset (which had 
annual average reductions of approximately $0.70/WAC), though it deserves note that the larger 
systems (i.e., 10-30 kW) in the CEC dataset were found to be on a more moderate cost trajectory 
over time, relative to the smaller systems supported by the CEC.  Similarly, though not 
statistically significant (p = 0.34), the coefficient on the crossed DATE_MONTH x LN_SIZE in 
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our Model 4 results for the CPUC suggests that larger CPUC systems may also have witnessed 
less pronounced reductions over time than smaller systems.  It is not entirely clear whether the 
more modest average cost declines in the CPUC dataset are due to:  (1) fundamental differences 
in the design of the CEC and CPUC programs; (2) differences in the size of the underlying PV 
systems; or (3) differences in the time periods covered (with the CEC’s program operating over a 
seven-year period, compared to the CPUC’s four-year period).  Some of these issues are 
explored further in Section 6. 
 
As reported in Section 4.2.1, our analysis of the CEC data revealed that some of the annual cost 
reductions were due to changes in PV module costs.  We were unable to replicate this finding 
with the CPUC dataset.  As mentioned earlier, we were unsuccessful in developing a reasonable 
set of Model 2 results for the CPUC dataset, as both the MODULE_COST_INDEX and the 
MAX_STD_REBATE variables showed coefficients of the opposite sign than expected, with 
colinearity being a clear problem.  We therefore heavily discount our Model 2 results here, and 
are unable to say anything definitive about the impact of module cost changes on system 
installed costs.  These results suggest that the CPUC’s dataset is more “noisy” and that cost 
trends are less-discernable than was the case with the CEC dataset (the bivariate figures in 
Section 5.1 also support this contention). 
 
Though not statistically significant, waitlisted systems appear to have been priced somewhat 
below (by ~$0.25/WAC) completed systems on average, perhaps suggesting that costs have a 
tendency to rise between the date of application and completion.  On the other hand, similar 
results are not found for approved systems.    
 
5.2.2 Policies and Incentives 
Our inability to formulate a useful Model 2 for the CPUC dataset yields overall results that are 
substantially less policy-rich than those based on the CEC’s dataset.  The coefficient for 
MAX_STD_REBATE, for example, is of the opposite sign that one would expect, suggesting 
that it may be picking up some unknown trend in the data (for the completed-only dataset in 
Appendix C, the coefficient is positive, but not statistically significant).  Similarly, due to 
colinearity with the MAX_STD_REBATE variable, we were unable to include a 
REBATE_%_CAP variable in Model 3.  We again find no statistical evidence that retail rates 
have had an impact on pre-rebate installed costs, though as noted earlier, our retail rate variable 
is imperfect. 
 
Despite these limitations, at least two interesting policy-related results derive from our regression 
analysis of the CPUC dataset: 
 
• First, as with the CEC data, we find some weak evidence that the size of the state tax credit 
has affected pre-rebate installed costs (though colinearity is again of some concern here).  
Specifically, the coefficient for STATE_TAX_CREDIT implies that an increase in the state 
credit from 0% to 15% was matched with an increase in installed costs of approximately 
$0.45/WAC.  The same result, however, is not supported by the completed-only regressions in 
Appendix C, which show a statistically insignificant coefficient for this variable. 
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• Second, we find that the existence of other sizable local incentives for PV installations 
(which are, to some degree, additive to the CPUC’s incentives) have affected system 
installed costs.  Specifically, the 56 PV systems that have received (or will receive) local 
incentives of more than $2/WAC (typically offered by the local publicly owned utility) have 
recorded higher costs of ~$0.60/WAC, on average (these results are largely consistent with the 
bivariate relationship shown in Figure 11).  For the 38 completed PV installations receiving 
such incentives, the average differential is higher, at approximately ~$0.80/WAC (see 
Appendix C).  This suggests that heavy subsidies dampen, to some degree, the motivation of 
installers to provide, and/or customers to seek, lower installed costs. 
 
In addition, though we were unable to evaluate the impact of the percentage rebate cap through 
regression analysis, it is interesting to note that 30% of all PV systems funded by the CPUC 
during the period in which the 50% cap was in place were priced from $8.75-$9.25/WAC (50% 
were priced from $8-$9.25/WAC).  The corresponding numbers in the four-month period of our 
sample after the cap was dropped (in mid-December 2004) are 5% and 11.5%, respectively, with 
the entire cost distribution having shifted to the left (i.e., toward lower costs).  These summary 
statistics support the contention that the percentage cap had the effect of inflating costs. 
 
5.2.3 System Size 
As with the CEC-funded systems, larger installations are found to be systematically less 
expensive than smaller systems on average.  Based on Model 1 results, and compared to a 30 kW 
system, we find that larger installations have lower average costs as follows:  100 kW 
($0.40/WAC lower); 250 kW ($0.70/WAC lower); 500 kW ($0.90/WAC lower); and 1,000 kW 
($1.1/WAC lower).  These regression results are largely consistent with the bivariate relationships 
depicted in Figure 9 (again, discounting the 60-100 kW size range due to potential data 
anomalies). 
 
5.2.4 Module Type 
Though only bordering on statistical significance (and far from significance in the completed-
only regressions reported in Appendix C), projects using thin film technology – of which there 
are 111 – are found to have had slightly higher costs on average over the course of the CPUC 
program (~$0.20/WAC).  This differs from the CEC results, which showed systematically lower 
costs of roughly $0.70/WAC on average.  The reasons for this difference are unclear.  Model 4 
demonstrates that the CPUC thin film cost differential has varied with system size, with larger 
thin film systems being relatively more expensive (compared to crystalline silicon) than smaller 
thin film installations.   
 
5.2.5 Installer Type and Experience  
Unlike the CEC results, more-experienced installers under the CPUC’s program have priced 
their systems at lower levels than less-experienced installers, with a differential of nearly 
$0.70/WAC on average (experienced installers of completed systems have had prices ~$0.45/WAC 
lower than their less-experienced counterparts, on average).  Model 4 shows that this differential 
has not changed markedly with time, or with system size (though Model 4 results in Appendix C 
suggest that the advantages of installer experience for completed systems have narrowed with 
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time).  Why the impact of installer experience varies between the CEC and CPUC datasets is 
unclear.  
 
Relative to the other systems in the dataset, the 16 systems managed and installed by the 
California Construction Authority have come in at a substantially and surprisingly lower cost of 
~$4/WAC, on average.  This may be due to the bulk purchase of PV equipment made possible by 
these multiple installations, and by the fact that the Construction Authority sought to bid out 
different elements of their projects separately, eliminating the need for a value-added, full-
service installer. Some have also speculated that the CCA is able to install systems at apparently 
lower costs than the PV industry at large due to the fact that it has no marketing, sales, or 
overhead costs, and/or that certain internal costs are not reported.   
 
5.2.6 System Location  
In comparison to the majority of systems installed in PG&E’s territory (where 47% of the 
CPUC-funded systems have been located), systems installed in other areas report higher pre-
rebate costs.  Systems located in SCE’s service territory are found to be approximately 
$0.30/WAC more expensive, while systems located in SDG&E’s territory have reported roughly 
$0.45/WAC higher costs, on average (the OTHER_UTILITY variable is not statistically 
significant).  The reasons for these inter-utility cost differences (which differ from the CEC 
results) are unclear, and would require further analysis.  Furthermore, similar results are not 
found in the regressions for completed systems shown in Appendix C, where none of the utility 
dummy variables reach statistical significance. 
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6. Comparing the CEC and CPUC Programs 
Sections 4 and 5 analyzed the CEC and CPUC datasets separately, not allowing for ready 
comparison between the two programs.  In this section we are interested in two specific 
questions that can be explored through a combined, side-by-side analysis of the two programs: 
 
• Are there significant pre-rebate installed cost differences between the two programs? 
• Have costs declined with time in a comparable fashion across the two programs?  
 
6.1 Fundamental Cost Variations Between Systems Funded by the Two Programs 
The CEC and CPUC programs have operated over different time periods, and have targeted 
different system sizes, complicating direct comparisons between the two.  Figure 14 shows 
average pre-rebate system installed costs, by size range, for both the CEC and CPUC programs.  
The figure only includes rebate applications received during the period of time (within our 
sample) in which both programs were operating contemporaneously:  July 1, 2001 to April 15, 
2005.  Clearly, economies of scale exist, with larger installations coming in at significantly lower 
costs than smaller ones.  The smaller graph inset in the upper right-hand corner of Figure 14 
zooms in on the 0-55 kW size range, to more clearly depict the system size range in which the 
two programs overlap.36
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Figure 14.  Average Installed Cost, by System Size (CEC and CPUC) 
 
Though systems funded by the CPUC’s program have, on average, exhibited somewhat lower 
costs than those funded by the CEC’s program, the opposite appears to be the case when 
considering only similar-sized systems.  This can be seen not only in Figure 14, but also Table 6, 
which presents summary statistics for systems in the 20-40 kW range from both programs.  
These data suggest that for similar-sized systems installed over the same time period, CPUC-
                                                 
36 Although the CPUC program nominally funds only systems that are at least 30 kW in size, it has funded two 
systems below that threshold, with reported sizes as low as 25 kW. 
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funded installations have been more expensive than CEC-funded systems (by $0.77/WAC for the 
pooled dataset that includes completed, approved, and waitlisted systems, and by $1.21/WAC for 
just the completed systems). 
 
Table 6.  Cost Variations Between the CEC and CPUC Programs:  Descriptive Statistics 
(20-40 kW systems, approved between 07/01/01 and 04/15/05) 
 Fully Pooled Data 
 CEC CPUC 
Observations (n) 202 237 
Average System Size (kW) 26.0 kW 32.7 kW 
Mean System Cost ($/WAC) $8.20/WAC $8.97/WAC
 
A simple regression of the same data included in Table 6 (focusing on the fully pooled dataset, 
but now including both CPUC and CEC data) yields the same basic conclusion, while controlling 
for variations in system size and application date.  The coefficient for CPUC_DUMMY in Table 
7 shows that among similar-sized systems, those funded by the CPUC’s program exhibit pre-
rebate installed costs that have been $0.60/WAC higher than those funded by the CEC.   
 
Table 7.  Cost Variations Between the CEC and CPUC Programs:  Regression Results 
(20-40 kW systems, approved between 07/01/01 and 04/15/05) 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT 8.887 <0.01 
TIME_MONTH -0.030 <0.01 
LN_SYSTEM_SIZE 0.101 0.86 
CPUC_DUMMY 0.612 <0.01 
R-SQUARED 0.10 
OBSERVATIONS (n) 439 
 
These findings support the oft-heard claim in California that the CPUC’s richer incentives in 
recent years ($4.5/WAC until December 2004, with a 50% cap – see Figure 3 from Section 2.2) 
have not motivated system cost reductions to the same extent as under the CEC’s program (the 
CEC’s program also offered $4.5/WAC at one time, but reduced that incentive more rapidly than 
the CPUC).  This finding is also consistent with results presented earlier that showed that rebate 
levels (for the CEC dataset) and the availability of other incentives (for the CPUC dataset) have 
influenced pre-rebate installed costs among both datasets.37
 
                                                 
37 Some might speculate that unaccounted-for differences in the two programs, rather than (or in addition to) policy 
design, could explain the higher installed costs among CPUC-funded systems.  For example, Section 4 found that 
within the CEC program, owner-installed systems, as well as systems installed on new home and affordable housing 
developments, cost significantly less on average than retrofit systems.  Since these three applications (i.e., owner-
installed, new home construction, and affordable housing) are unique to the CEC program (due to the 30 kW size 
threshold, which more or less precludes them from the CPUC program), some might speculate that these types of 
programmatic differences have driven the cost differential shown in Tables 6 and 7.  Though our analysis does not 
enable us to lay such contentions entirely to rest, we reiterate that Tables 6 and 7 pertain only to systems of 20-40 kW 
in size – i.e., a size range in which few, if any, CEC-funded owner-installed, new home construction, or affordable 
housing systems reside.  As such, we find it likely that the cost differences are caused by differences in policy 
design. 
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6.2 Consistency of Cost Reductions Between Systems Funded by the Two Programs 
Analysis results presented in Sections 4 and 5 suggest that the CEC’s program for smaller (< 30 
kW) PV systems has yielded greater cost reductions over time than has the CPUC’s program for 
larger (30 kW and above) systems.  This is somewhat supported by the summary information 
provided in Figure 15, which shows mean installed costs over time (expressed in monthly 
intervals), by date of rebate application.  Although average installed costs in both programs have 
been on a similar trajectory (and in a very similar range) since mid-2003, earlier CPUC costs 
exhibit significant variability with little apparent trend.  The bivariate nature (i.e., cost vs. time, 
with no attempt to control for other variables) of the graph, however, makes it difficult to draw 
conclusions from Figure 15 alone. 
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Figure 15.  Average Installed Cost Over Time (CEC and CPUC) 
 
To investigate this question statistically, we combine the CPUC and CEC datasets (including 
completed, approved, and waitlisted systems), again truncating the date range from July 1, 2001 
to April 15, 2005.  We include only those independent variables that were included in the earlier 
Model 1 results from Sections 4 and 5, crossed with either a CPUC or CEC dummy.38   
Table 8 reports the results of this combined CPUC/CEC regression.   
 
                                                 
38 We acknowledge that this combination of the two datasets is not perfect, and potentially excludes variables that 
could hold some explanatory power over differences in installed costs among the programs.  For example, a few of 
the CPUC-funded systems may have been installed as shade-providing carports, which one would expect to have 
higher installed costs.  Similarly, one of the installers active in the CPUC program often adheres PV modules to 
insulating roofing panels, which again could result in higher costs (while presumably delivering higher value as 
well).  For the most part, the datasets were not robust enough to enable us to tease out and examine these potentially 
important variables. 
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Table 8.  Regression Results for Pooled CPUC/CEC Dataset 
(systems approved between 07/01/01 and 04/15/05)  
Variable Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT 12.208 <0.01 
TIME_MONTH -0.076 <0.01 
CPUC_TIME_MONTH 0.046 <0.01 
LN_SYSTEM_SIZE -0.814 <0.01 
CPUC_LN_SYSTEM_SIZE 0.492 <0.01 
CEC_APPROVED 0.457 <0.01 
CPUC_COMPLETED -0.950 <0.01 
CPUC_APPROVED -0.883 0.02 
CPUC_WAITLISTED -1.172 <0.01 
CEC_SCE -0.089 <0.01 
CEC_SDG&E -0.266 <0.01 
CEC_OTHER_UTILITY -2.333 <0.01 
CEC_NEW_CONST_LARGE -1.316 <0.01 
CEC_NEW_CONST_SMALL 0.163 0.02 
CEC_SCHOOLS 0.250 0.18 
CEC_AFFORDABLE_HOUSING -2.030 <0.01 
CEC_OWNER_INSTALLED -1.864 <0.01 
CEC_INSTALLER_EXPERIENCE 0.228 <0.01 
CEC_RETAILER_EXPERIENCE 0.144 <0.01 
CEC_SQRT_POP_DENSITY 4.9E-3 <0.01 
CEC_THIN_FILM -0.594 <0.01 
CPUC_SCE 0.309 <0.01 
CPUC_SDG&E 0.486 <0.01 
CPUC_OTHER_UTILITY 0.072 0.69 
CPUC_OTHER_INCENTIVES 0.626 0.10 
CPUC_INSTALLER_EXPERIENCE -0.686 <0.01 
CPUC_CALIF_CONST_AUTHORITY -4.028 <0.01 
CPUC_THIN_FILM 0.183 0.18 
R-SQUARED 0.31 
OBSERVATIONS (n) 17,453 
 
Most of the results presented in this combined regression are consistent with our earlier findings.  
Economies of scale are found to exist, with greater economies among the smaller CEC-funded 
systems than the larger CPUC-funded systems.  Experienced installers are found to charge more 
in the CEC dataset, but charge less in the CPUC dataset.  The impact of the various utility 
service territory dummies also remains significant, with differences between the two datasets.  
Further work would be required to understand the reasons for these discrepancies.  The results 
for the other variables included in the combined regression are also generally consistent with the 
results presented earlier. 
 
Of most interest here, the TIME_MONTH coefficient shows that systems funded by the CEC 
over this time period experienced an average monthly decrease in pre-rebate installed cost of 
$0.076/WAC ($0.91/WAC each year).  The CPUC_TIME_MONTH variable shows that the 
systems funded by the CPUC have experienced far more modest average cost declines of 
$0.03/WAC ($0.36/WAC each year).  Annual average cost reductions for CEC-funded systems (< 
30 kW) outpaced those of CPUC-funded systems (30 kW and above) by a multiplier of 2.5.  As 
hypothesized earlier, this may be due to the more substantial (proportionally) labor and 
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installation costs associated with smaller systems and the greater opportunities in that market 
segment for distribution and installation efficiency gains.39  Alternatively, it could be a result of 
policy design – whereas the CEC has (since 2003) progressively lowered its rebate over time, the 
CPUC has been slower to follow suit.  The fact that CEC- and CPUC-funded average system 
costs have apparently tracked each other since mid-2003 (see Figure 15), however, makes both 
of these explanations somewhat less likely.  Ultimately, the quality of our data does not allow us 
to definitively explain the difference in cost reductions between the two programs, or even prove 
that the programs themselves are responsible for the cost reductions.40  We recommend that 
future work explore these questions in more detail.   
 
 
                                                 
39 As shown in Sections 4 and 5, we find this same effect – smaller systems exhibiting greater cost reductions over 
time – not only across programs, but also within each of the two programs. 
40 Though it is perhaps logical to assume that California’s PV programs have caused, or at least contributed to, the 
empirical cost reductions, as discussed earlier, nothing in our analysis enables us to assign causation – i.e., we are 
unable to definitively conclude that the California programs are driving the cost reductions.  To be able to assign 
causation, we would need to similarly analyze a “control” market – i.e., one in which no PV incentive programs 
exist.  Identifying such a market for PV may be difficult or impossible, given the widespread public support that PV 
has garnered, but future work could at least analyze other markets in which PV is subsidized, but to a different 
extent or in a different manner than in California. 
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7. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The promise of electricity generated from photovoltaics is alluring:  PV is renewable, clean, 
distributed, modular, and fuel-free.  In an era of concern about energy security, energy price 
volatility, and the global climate, solar energy offers one potential technological solution.  As a 
result, adoption of solar power is accelerating, driven primarily by government incentives.  But 
cost reductions remain vital for the long-run success of the solar market.  A recent report 
prepared for the CPUC, for example, suggests that the CPUC’s SGIP is not yet cost-effective 
from a societal or non-participant perspective (Itron 2005b). 
 
Historical experience, engineering studies, and learning curve theory tell us that solar costs will 
drop over time, though the degree of future price reduction remains uncertain.  A primary goal of 
government incentive programs is to encourage these cost reductions.  In fact, some have argued 
that long-term, sustained government deployment programs will be necessary to drive 
investments in manufacturing and system delivery infrastructure, and thereby reduce costs. 
 
Japan’s success in creating a sizable, stable, and well-functioning residential solar market 
through a sustained long-term commitment to progressively lower rebates is often cited as 
evidence of this effect (see, e.g., Osborn et al. 2005).  The Japanese program supported more 
than 220,000 residential PV systems from its inception in 1994 through 2004, including over 
60,000 in 2004 alone.  Costs for standard 3 kW residential systems averaged roughly $6.2/WDC 
in 2004, or $7.4/WAC.  These costs have declined over time as a well-functioning market 
infrastructure has developed, with residential PV costs declining by an average of 8.3% annually 
from 1998 to 2004 (in real Yen/kW for standard 3 kW systems) (RTS 2004; RTS 2005). 
 
The analysis presented in this paper finds clear evidence that the California market has also 
experienced reductions in PV costs over time.  Cost reductions are particularly significant for 
CEC-funded systems, where regression results show an average annual decline of approximately 
$0.70/WAC – nearly twice that achieved under the CPUC program.41  At the means of the data, 
this represents annual average percentage declines of 7.3% and 4.1% for CEC- and CPUC-
funded systems, respectively.  Although our analysis cannot, without comparison to a control 
group, definitively conclude that the CEC and CPUC programs caused these cost reductions, it is 
clear that – despite the lack of continuity and stability experienced by both programs – pre-rebate 
installed costs have come down, especially among the CEC-funded systems.   
 
Some of these overall cost reductions are due to decreases in worldwide module costs 
(notwithstanding the recent increase in those costs).  Much of the cost reductions, however, 
appear to have come from improvements in non-module costs – e.g., installation and balance of 
system costs.  These reductions in non-module costs are encouraging because they demonstrate 
improvements in the delivery infrastructure for PV in California.   
 
Several policy recommendations fall out of our analysis: 
 
                                                 
41 This cost decline is generally consistent with that found by Mortensen (2001), who looked at 278 systems 
installed between 1997 and 2000, and found annual cost reductions over time of $0.60/ WDC (in real, 1997 dollars). 
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Reducing non-module costs should be a primary goal of local PV programs.  Unlike module 
costs, which are set in a worldwide market and are therefore heavily influenced by factors 
outside of the control of an individual PV program (e.g., demand for PV in Japan and Germany), 
non-module costs are potentially subject to the influence of local PV programs.  Our analysis of 
the CEC dataset, for example, shows that module costs appear to be directly passed through one-
for-one to the system purchaser, leaving non-module costs – e.g., installation and balance of 
system costs – as the remaining cost items potentially influenced by a local PV program.  
Though we are unable to prove conclusively that non-module cost reductions in California have 
been caused by the state’s incentive programs, our analysis results do show that non-module cost 
reductions have been significant.  State incentive programs may wish to undertake programmatic 
activities aimed specifically at reducing non-module costs, which could range from targeted 
approaches to building local supply infrastructure (e.g., providing business development funding 
to installers, supporting standardized PV products, or offering installer training and certification), 
to something as simple as making PV system cost and performance data more publicly accessible 
and transparent to further encourage supply competition. 
 
Sustained, long-term programs may enable more significant cost reductions.  Sustained, 
sizable, and stable markets for PV may be the most direct way of reducing non-module costs 
because such markets will presumably attract suppliers and encourage those suppliers to create 
an efficient delivery infrastructure.  Though California’s cost reductions are significant, 
experience from Japan suggests that deeper cost reductions are possible.  Japan’s average 
residential system cost of $7.4/WAC in 2004 (for standard 3 kW installations) compares to an 
average of roughly $8.8/WAC in California (for 2-5 kW systems with application dates in 2004).  
Moreover, just focusing on CEC-funded installations in the 2-5 kW size range with application 
dates of 1999-2004 (see Figure 742), the average annual cost reduction has been 5.2%, 
substantially below the 8.9% annual average reduction for 3 kW systems installed in Japan over 
the same period.  Since 2001, however, average annual residential system cost reductions in 
Japan and California have been approximately equal, at 7.3% for California and 6.7% for Japan.  
These data perhaps suggest that as the CEC’s solar program has scaled up it has begun to 
experience a similar cost-reduction dynamic as evidenced in Japan, but that further cost declines 
are possible.  In mid-January 2006, the CPUC issued an order that intends to create a much more 
sizable and stable market for PV in California;  a key goal of that program is to replicate and 
even exceed the cost reductions seen under the Japanese program (the adopted program is to 
reduce rebate levels by roughly 10% each year, in nominal terms, far exceeding the recent 
system cost reductions seen under the California and Japanese programs).  
 
The structure and size of PV incentives should encourage cost reduction, not cost inflation.  
We find some troubling evidence that policy design has adversely impacted the cost of PV 
systems in California.  For example, the 50% cap on the size of the rebate employed by both 
programs at one time or another appears to have, at best, impeded cost reductions, and at worst, 
contributed to artificial cost inflation.  As such, the decision by both programs to abandon such 
percentage caps is a positive development; we recommend that other state PV incentive 
programs do the same.  Furthermore, the total pre-rebate cost of PV installations in California 
has tracked, to some degree, the size of the rebate itself.  In particular, there appears to be a tight 
relationship between rebate levels and average pre-rebate installed costs among CEC-funded 
                                                 
42 Data for 1998 are not included here due to the limited number of systems in that year. 
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systems.  The CPUC’s relatively richer rebate also appears to have resulted in some cost inflation 
for systems installed under that program.  This is particularly true for systems that also received 
sizable local incentives, in addition to those offered under the CPUC’s program.  These results 
suggest that heavy subsidies can dampen, at least to some degree, the motivation of installers to 
provide, and/or customers to seek, lower installed costs.  Whether this link is merely 
representative of the “teething problems” that are typical of new programs,43 or should instead be 
of long-term concern is somewhat unclear.  As rebates are reduced over time, however, we might 
expect that the link between incentive levels and total pre-rebate installed costs will be severed, 
as lower rebates require contractors to price systems at cost (with a reasonable margin for profit) 
in order to ensure a sale.  Hence, while rich incentives may be required initially to jump-start the 
market, over time the incentives should decline to a level that can support a functional market 
infrastructure without providing room for potential price manipulation.44
 
Targeted incentives that account for the relative economics of different system sizes and 
application types may be appropriate.  Analysis presented in this paper suggests that installed 
costs are heavily dependent upon the size and type of installation.  Though there is a significant 
spread in the data, we find clear evidence of sizable economies of scale in PV installations, with 
larger PV systems coming in (on average) at significantly lower installed costs than smaller 
systems.  We also find that systems installed in large new home developments are, on average, 
far more economical than retrofitted systems, or even systems installed in smaller new home 
clusters.  Systems installed on affordable housing, which also often involve new construction and 
presumably enable bulk system installation, also show significant savings on an installed cost 
basis.  Finally, the data reveal that owner-installed systems in the CEC program, and systems 
installed by the California Construction Authority (which might also be considered owner-
installed systems, of a sort) in the CPUC program, have come in at substantially lower costs than 
contractor-installed systems.45  In aggregate, these results suggest that a further targeting of 
incentives to account for the relative economics of different system sizes and application types 
may be appropriate.46
 
                                                 
43 Such “teething problems” might include initial over-subsidization intended to spur the market, coupled with 
insufficient supply infrastructure to handle the resulting increase in demand, leading to lackluster competition and 
artificial price increases until new supply infrastructure enters the market. 
44 Though some might be inclined to draw from this discussion of capacity-based incentives an argument in favor of 
performance-based incentives, we note that nothing in our dataset or analysis permits a comparison of these different 
types of incentives. 
45 These results suggest that the CEC’s current practice of providing reduced incentives for owner-installed systems 
is appropriate. 
46 Targeting PV incentives may become even more critical under the Energy Policy Act of 2005’s new or expanded 
federal tax credits for PV, which went into effect in January 2006.  Specifically, certain entities (e.g., non-taxable 
entities or taxable entities subject to the alternative minimum tax) will not be able to benefit from the new or 
expanded federal tax credits.  Furthermore, the new 30% residential credit is capped at $2,000, which means that it 
is worth relatively more to smaller than to larger residential PV systems.  These differential impacts suggest that 
unless states fine-tune their incentives, they may end up disadvantaging certain market segments, while over-
subsidizing others. 
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Appendix A:  Data Manipulation and Cleaning 
 
A considerable amount of data cleaning and manipulation was required for the CEC and, to a 
much lesser extent, for the CPUC datasets.  Tables 9 and 10 summarize these details.  
 
Table 9.  Data Manipulation and Cleaning:  CEC Dataset 
CEC Variable Data Manipulation and Cleaning 
SYSTEM COST 
Dependent variable, expressed in terms of $/WAC.  Only systems with costs 
ranging from $4-30/WAC were included in the analysis.  Systems with costs 
outside of this range likely represent data entry errors, or atypically cheap or 
expensive systems.  Different reasonable system cost restrictions were tested, with 
limited effect on regression results.  These cost restrictions eliminated 85 systems, 
totaling 0.5 MW, from the analysis.  Costs represent “eligible costs,” excluding 
any costs for battery back-up. The data used in our analysis are based on the 
inverter efficiency ratings used at the time of system rebate application.  An 
analysis of inverter efficiency ratings over time shows little change in average 
ratings (less than 1%, on average), so changes in rating methodologies should not 
be a major source of error in the results.  In the database provided by the CEC, we 
used the “system cost” field over the “total system cost” field, where available.  
System costs were converted to real 2004 dollars.    
TIME_MONTH 
Date of application, in months, numbered consecutively from beginning of each 
program.  We tested alternative functional forms, as well as different time periods 
(e.g., quarterly, semi-annual), but none outperformed a simple monthly linear 
model.  In the dataset provided by the CEC, we used the “@30date” field 
(representing the date the application was received by the CEC) where available 
and when that date preceded the “date received” field; we used the “date received” 
field otherwise (representing the date on which the system application was entered 
into the CEC dataset – sometimes up to a month after the application was actually 
received).  Where neither field was filled in, we were in some cases able to 
estimate a date based on other information provided in the CEC dataset. 
SYSTEM_SIZE 
Limited to systems less than 30 kW in size.  The CEC program initially funded 
systems over 30 kW in size, but ceased providing funding to such systems in 
March 2003.  We exclude these larger systems from our analysis (a total of 66 
systems, and 9.1 MW of capacity) to ensure that a limited number of outliers do 
not unduly affect our analysis results.  We use a logarithmic functional form 
because, upon visual inspection and after statistical tests, that functional form 
appeared to fit our underlying data better than the alternatives that we tested.  The 
AC size data used in our analysis are based on the inverter efficiency ratings used 
at the time of system rebate application.   
MAX_STD_REBATE 
Equals the CEC’s published rebate for contractor-installed systems (not on 
schools or affordable housing) in $/WAC (2004 $).  In nominal dollars, this 
variable equals $3/WAC from inception to Feb 8, 2001, when it increases to 
$4.5/WAC.  Thereafter, it decreases to $4/WAC on February 19, 2003, $3.8/WAC on 
July 1, 2003, $3.2/WAC on January 1, 2004, $3/WAC on July 1, 2004, and 
$2.8/WAC on January 1, 2005.  For systems above 10 kW, the standard rebate 
dropped from $3/WAC to $2.5 WAC prior to February 8, 2001 – the date was 
determined through a review of incentive applications. We maintained an 
application-date-based determination of standard incentive levels, even where 
actual incentive payments seemed to disagree with those value (such 
discrepancies were notable during the transition from $3 to $4.5/WAC incentive 
levels, when customers were able to update earlier applications at the higher 
incentive level).   
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CEC Variable Data Manipulation and Cleaning 
REBATE_%_CAP 
Dummy variable equal to 1 when the rebate is capped at 50% (or 40% for systems 
above 10 kW for a short duration) of eligible installed costs (from program 
inception through February 18, 2003).  We attempted to develop a variable to 
reflect the degree to which the percentage cap was binding, but that variable did 
not out-perform the simple one used here. Variable only used only in Model 3. 
STATE_TAX_CREDIT 
State tax credit (15% for systems installed in 2001-2003, 7.5% for systems 
installed in 2004-2005; 0% otherwise) was signed by the Governor on October 8, 
2001.  Given that our dates are based on application receipt, rather than system 
completion, for the purposes of this variable we assume that there is an 
“expected” 6-month lag between application receipt and project completion.  We 
therefore set this variable equal to 15% for applications received from October 8, 
2001 through June 30, 2003; 7.5% for applications received from July 1, 2003 
through June 30, 2005, and 0% for all other dates.  Only applies to systems under 
200 kW in size. Used only in Model 3. 
RETAIL_RATES 
We assumed that systems less than or equal to 6 kW are residential systems (and 
so pay residential retail rates), and systems larger than 6 kW are commercial 
systems (and so pay commercial retail rates).  For each reservation, we first 
determine in what utility service territory the system is located.  If PGE, SCE, 
SDGE, SMUD, or LADWP, this variable equals the average residential or 
commercial retail rate (from Energy Information Administration, or EIA, 
databases) from the current and previous 11 months (12-month average).  EIA 
average retail rate data for all other utilities is annual (i.e., not monthly), so if 
system is installed in any utility service territory other than those mentioned 
above, this variable equals the applicable annual average residential or 
commercial retail rate at the time of application.  So, for each reservation, the 
retail rate variable is a function of system size (to determine whether residential or 
commercial retail rates are appropriate) and location (to determine applicable 
utility).  Used only in Model 3. 
APPROVED Dummy variable equal to 1 if the rebate application has been approved, but not 
yet completed.  We included the following database categories of systems as 
“approved:”  A (approved), CR (claim received), ET (extended), H (hold), and W 
(warning letter).  We did not include systems that had been cancelled (C), 
declined (D), expired (EX), or received but not yet approved (R).  The default is a 
completed system (PC, for “project complete”). 
SCE 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the system is or will be installed in SCE’s service 
territory.  Where field is not filled in, used zip code or city to estimate appropriate 
territory.  Fixed small number of clearly discrepant entries.  Default location is 
PG&E service territory. 
SDG&E 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the system is or will be installed in SDG&E’s 
service territory. Where field is not filled in, used zip code or city to estimate 
appropriate territory. Fixed small number of clearly discrepant entries.  Default 
location is PG&E service territory. 
OTHER_UTILITY 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the system is or will be installed in a utility service 
territory other than PG&E’s, SCE’s, or SDG&E’s.  Where field is not filled in, 
used zip code or city to estimate appropriate territory.  Fixed small number of 
clearly discrepant entries.  Default location is PG&E service territory. 
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CEC Variable Data Manipulation and Cleaning 
NEW_CONST_LARGE 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the system is or will be installed on a new home 
(during construction phase) as part of an effort to install PV on multiple homes 
within a new subdivision.  Generally must include at least three homes to qualify.  
Determinations made both according to CEC database “Category” and “Utility” 
fields, as well as a judgment based on “Contractor” field in some cases (where it 
is clear that the system is part of a larger development).  Default is a residential 
retrofit system. 
NEW_CONST_SINGLE 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the system is or will be installed on a new home 
(during construction phase), but not as part of an effort to install PV on multiple 
homes within a new subdivision.  Generally must include less than three homes to 
qualify.  Determinations made both according to CEC database “Category” and 
“Utility” fields, as well as a judgment based on “Contractor” field in some cases 
(where it is clear that the system is part of a larger development).  Default is a 
residential retrofit system. 
SCHOOLS Dummy variable equal to 1 if the system is or will be installed on a school, based on CEC database “Category” field. 
AFFORDABLE_HOUSING Dummy variable equal to 1 if the system is or will be installed on affordable housing, based on CEC database “Category” field. 
OWNER_INSTALLED 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the system clearly is or will be installed by the 
system owner, rather than a hired contractor, based on CEC database “C-Install” 
and “C_field.”  If not clearly indicated as owner installed, we assumed that 
systems were contractor installed (though we acknowledge likely errors in making 
this assumption). 
INSTALLER_EXPERIENCE 
Installers are identified as “experienced” installers (variable = 1) if they rank 
within the top 5% of all installers in terms of the number of systems completed 
over the entire data period.  Used contractor ID numbers in CEC database.  Fixed 
clear ID number errors; filled in blanks with most likely values in numerous 
instances based on contractor or retailer name; consolidated IDs for firms that 
appeared to be the same; created new IDs where missing values (over 1000 
records); where no data provided, assumed that inexperienced installer.  
RETAILER_EXPERIENCE 
Retailers are identified as “experienced” retailers (variable = 1) if they rank within 
the top 5% of all retailers in terms of the number of systems completed over the 
entire data period.  Cleaned up data entry errors, and made names consistent 
where possible and where a single firm appears to be entered under different 
names. Filled in blanks with best guesses, where necessary, based on historical 
contractor-retailer relationships. 
POPULATION_DENSITY 
Population density (population per square mile) was derived from zip code and/or 
address listings in the database, in combination with US Census Bureau data by 
zip code tabulation area.  We used a square root functional form because it fits the 
data well, and because it is assumed that changes in density in sparsely populated 
areas will have a greater affect than similar changes in density in more densely 
populated urban areas.  Used city average population density, where zip code is 
blank but city is identified.  Filled in with statewide average values where data is 
lacking.  
THIN_FILM 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the system involves thin-film (e.g., amorphous 
silicon, copper indium selenide, or cadmium telluride) rather than crystalline 
technology.  This information was discernible from the module manufacturer 
and/or model number. 
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CEC Variable Data Manipulation and Cleaning 
MODULE_COST_INDEX 
Annual variable that, from 1998-2004, equals the average cost (in 2004 $/WDC-
STC) of power (rather than “commodity”) modules from Strategies Unlimited 
(2005). 2005 value derived from the percentage change in Solar Buzz’s “All Solar 
Module Index” from 2004 (average of monthly values) to 2005 (through October), 
applied to 2004 Strategies Unlimited value.  
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Table 10.  Data Manipulation and Cleaning:  CPUC Dataset 
CPUC Variable Data Manipulation and Cleaning 
SYSTEM COST 
Dependent variable, expressed in terms of $/WAC.  Only systems with costs 
ranging from $4-30/WAC were included in the analysis.  Systems with costs 
outside of this range likely represent data entry errors, or atypically cheap or 
expensive systems.  Different system cost restrictions were tested, with some 
impact on regression results.  With no easy way of determining which cost 
range was objectively “right,” we opted to maintain consistency with the CEC 
dataset (i.e., $4-30/WAC).  These cost restrictions eliminated 4 systems, totaling 
1.3 MW, from the analysis. Data on eligible system costs should be broadly 
consistent with that reported for the CEC. Eliminated two systems labeled as 
PV systems that appeared to be wind systems.  Eliminated records for which 
cost data were not provided (~220 projects on PG&E’s waiting list). System 
costs were converted to real 2004 dollars. 
TIME_MONTH 
Date of application, in months, numbered consecutively from beginning of each 
program.  We tested alternative functional forms, as well as different time 
periods (e.g., quarterly, semi-annual), but none clearly outperformed a simple 
monthly linear model. 
SYSTEM_SIZE 
Theoretically limited to systems of at least 30 kW in size, though the CPUC 
database does contain a few systems less than 30 kW (and as low as 25 kW).  
We use a logarithmic functional form because, upon visual inspection and after 
statistical tests, that functional form appeared to fit our underlying data no 
worse than the alternatives that we tested. The AC size data used in our analysis 
are based on the inverter efficiency ratings used at the time of system rebate 
application.   
MAX_STD_REBATE 
Equals the CPUC’s published rebate for PV systems in $/WAC (2004 $) at the 
time of first application.  In nominal dollars, this variable equals $4.5/WAC 
from inception through December 15, 2004, after which it decreased to 
$3.5/WAC.  Used in Model 2 only. 
REBATE_%_CAP 
Dummy variable equal to 1 when the rebate is capped at 50% of eligible 
installed costs (from program inception through December 15, 2004).  Not 
used, due to colinearity problems. 
STATE_TAX_CREDIT 
State tax credit (15% for systems installed in 2001-2003, 7.5% for systems 
installed in 2004-2005; 0% otherwise) was signed by the Governor on October 
8, 2001.  Given that our dates are based on application receipt, rather than 
system completion, for the purposes of this variable we assume that there is an 
“expected” 6-month lag between application receipt and project completion.  
We therefore set this variable equal to 15% for applications received from 
October 8, 2001 through June 30, 2003; 7.5% for applications received from 
July 1, 2003 through June 30, 2005, and 0% for all other dates.  Actual lag is 
closer to one year, but used 6-months to remain consistency with approach used 
for CEC dataset.  Only applies to systems under 200 kW in size. Used only in 
Model 3. 
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CPUC Variable Data Manipulation and Cleaning 
RETAIL_RATES 
We assumed that all systems funded by the CPUC program are commercial 
systems (and so pay commercial retail rates).  For each reservation, we first 
determine in what utility service territory the system is located.  If PGE, SCE, 
SDGE, SMUD, or LADWP, this variable equals the average commercial retail 
rate (from Energy Information Administration, or EIA, databases) from the 
current and previous 11 months (12-month average).  EIA average retail rate 
data for all other utilities is annual (i.e., not monthly), so if system is installed in 
any utility service territory other than those mentioned above, this variable 
equals the applicable annual average commercial retail rate at the time of 
application.  So, for each reservation, the retail rate variable is a function of 
system size (to determine whether residential or commercial retail rates are 
appropriate) and location (to determine applicable utility).  Used only in Model 
3. 
OTHER_INCENTIVES 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the application indicates that the system will also 
receive other (i.e., non-CPUC) incentives of more than $2/WAC.  Note that 
systems have been able to only capture a portion of these other incentives, as 
the CPUC incentive is reduced to some degree when other incentives are 
offered (though the rules for this reduction have changed over time).  
APPROVED Dummy variable equal to 1 if the rebate application has been approved, but not yet completed.  The default is a completed system. 
WAITLISTED Dummy variable equal to 1 if the rebate application has been waitlisted, due to insufficient program funding.  The default is a completed system. 
SCE Dummy variable equal to 1 if the system is or will be installed in SCE’s service territory.  Default location is PG&E service territory. 
SDG&E Dummy variable equal to 1 if the system is or will be installed in SDG&E’s service territory.  Default location is PG&E service territory. 
OTHER_UTILITY 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the system is or will be installed in a utility 
service territory other than PG&E’s, SCE’s, or SDG&E’s.  Default location is 
PG&E service territory. 
INSTALLER_EXPERIENCE Installers are identified as “experienced” installers (variable = 1) if they rank 
within the top 5% of all installers in terms of the number of systems completed 
over the entire data period.  Filled in blank entries where possible; where not 
possible, assumed that installer was inexperienced. 
CALIF_CONST_AUTHORITY Dummy variable equal to 1 if the California Construction Authority is listed as 
the installer. 
THIN_FILM Dummy variable equal to 1 if the system involves thin-film (e.g., amorphous 
silicon, copper indium selenide, or cadmium telluride) rather than crystalline 
technology.  This information was discernible from the module manufacturer 
and/or model number. 
MODULE_COST_INDEX Annual variable that, from 1998-2004, equals the average cost (in 2004 $/WDC-
STC) of power (rather than “commodity”) modules from Strategies Unlimited 
(2005). 2005 value derived from the percentage change in Solar Buzz’s “All 
Solar Module Index” from 2004 (average of monthly values) to 2005 (through 
October), applied to 2004 Strategies Unlimited value. 
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Appendix B:  Cost Distributions Over Time 
 
The distribution of PV system costs under the CEC and CPUC programs have changed over 
time.  Figures 16 and 17 illustrate these trends for the CEC and CPUC, respectively. In the case 
of the CEC-funded systems, the distribution of system costs has both narrowed and shifted 
towards lower costs over time.  For CPUC-funded systems, the distribution has shifted to the left 
with little noticeable narrowing of the distribution itself.  
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Figure 16.  Distribution of System Costs Over Time (CEC) 
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Figure 17.  Distribution of System Costs Over Time (CPUC) 
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Appendix C:  Additional Regression Analysis Results 
 
Tables 11 through 13 provide summary statistics and regressions results for just the completed 
CEC- and CPUC-funded PV systems.  Results presented here are reasonably consistent with 
those using the fully pooled data, presented in the body of the report.  
 
Table 11.  Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Analysis (Completed Systems Only) 
CEC (< 30 kW) CPUC (>= 30 kW) Continuous Variables 
Mean Max Min Std Dev Mean Max Min Std Dev 
INSTALLED_COST 9.9 29.3 4.1 2.3 9.0 17.2 4.8 1.7 
TIME_MONTH 57.7 83.0 0.0 14.1 20.2 39.0 0.0 9.3 
SYSTEM_SIZE 3.8 30.0 0.1 3.0 109.1 1,050 30.0 147.5 
MAX_STD_REBATE 4.1 4.8 2.7 0.6 4.7 4.8 4.5 0.1 
STATE_TAX_CREDIT 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.05 
RETAIL RATES 0.13 0.19 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.16 0.07 0.02 
MODULE_COST_INDEX 3.5 4.5 3.3 0.3 3.4 3.9 3.3 0.2 
POPULATION_DENSITY 2,690 52,959 0.41 4,138 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Dummy Variables Observations (Dummy = 1) 
Percent 
of Total 
Observations 
(Dummy = 1) 
Percent 
of Total 
REBATE_%_CAP 5,149 40% 327 100% 
OTHER_INCENTIVES n/a n/a 38 12% 
SCE** 2,961 23% 81 25% 
SDG&E** 1,945 15% 36 11% 
OTHER_UTILITY** 132 1% 50 15% 
NEW_CONST_LARGE† 710 6% n/a n/a 
NEW_CONST_SMALL† 242 2% n/a n/a 
SCHOOLS† 15 0% n/a n/a 
AFFORDABLE_HOUSING† 75 1% n/a n/a 
OWNER_INSTALLED 733 6% n/a n/a 
INSTALLER_EXPERIENCE 7,147 56% 140 43% 
RETAILER_EXPERIENCE 4,766 37% n/a n/a 
CALIF_CONSTR_AUTHORITY n/a n/a 16 5% 
THIN-FILM 265 2% 35 11% 
** PG&E, which represents the “base” utility territory to which the others are compared, contains the majority of 
systems: 7,818 (61%) systems in the CEC dataset, and 160 (49%) systems in the CPUC dataset 
† Standard retrofits represent the “base” type of system to which others are compared in the CEC dataset, and 
include 11,814 total systems (92%)  
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Table 12.  Regression Results for CEC Dataset (Completed Systems Only)  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Variable 
coef. p coef. p coef. p coef. p 
INTERCEPT 20.488 <0.01 11.850 <0.01 11.794 <0.01 13.536 <0.01
TIME_MONTH -0.058 <0.01 -0.024 <0.01 -0.024 <0.01 -0.090 <0.01
LN_SYSTEM_SIZE -0.914 <0.01 -0.923 <0.01 -0.927 <0.01 -1.342 <0.01
SCE -0.129 <0.01 -0.132 <0.01 -0.145 <0.01 -0.115 <0.01
SDG&E -0.465 <0.01 -0.510 <0.01 -0.494 <0.01 -0.522 <0.01
OTHER_UTILITY -2.244 <0.01 -2.576 <0.01 -2.683 <0.01 -2.581 <0.01
NEW_CONST_LARGE -1.714 <0.01 -1.744 <0.01 -1.718 <0.01 -3.383 0.03 
NEW_CONST_SMALL 0.331 <0.01 0.316 0.01 0.280 0.02 4.378 0.07 
SCHOOLS -0.219 0.78 0.049 0.95 -0.043 0.96 0.193 0.82 
AFFORDABLE_HOUSING -2.034 <0.01 -1.873 <0.01 -1.775 <0.01 -1.827 <0.01
OWNER_INSTALLED -1.622 <0.01 -1.679 <0.01 -1.685 <0.01 -0.251 0.86 
INSTALLER_EXPERIENCE 0.457 <0.01 0.466 <0.01 0.467 <0.01 2.314 <0.01
RETAILER_EXPERIENCE 0.187 <0.01 0.191 <0.01 0.189 <0.01 0.546 0.41 
SQRT_POP_DENSITY 3.4E-03 <0.01 3.3E-03 <0.01 3.3E-03 <0.01 8.9E-03 0.38 
THIN_FILM -0.880 <0.01 -0.916 <0.01 -0.919 <0.01 -4.654 0.03 
MAX_STD_REBATE     0.732 <0.01 0.560 <0.01 0.783 <0.01
MODULE_COST_INDEX     1.075 <0.01 1.173 <0.01 1.291 <0.01
REBATE_%_CAP         0.191 0.14     
STATE_TAX_CREDIT         2.325 <0.01     
RETAIL_RATES         0.929 0.69     
DATE_MONTH x LN_SIZE             0.010 <0.01
NEW_CONST_LARGE x LN_SIZE             -0.332 0.11 
NEW_CONST_SMALL x LN_SIZE             -0.172 0.45 
OWNER_INSTALLED x LN_SIZE             -0.079 0.65 
INSTALLER_EXP x LN_SIZE             -0.168 0.05 
RETAILER_EXP x LN_SIZE             0.060 0.43 
SQRT_POP_DENSITY x LN_SIZE             -9.2E-04 0.44 
THIN_FILM x LN_SIZE             0.199 0.52 
NEW_CONST_LARGE x TIME             0.071 <0.01
NEW_CONST_SMALL x TIME             -0.041 <0.01
OWNER_INSTALLED x TIME             -0.016 0.04 
INSTALLER_EXP x TIME             -8.7E-03 0.02 
RETAILER_EXP x TIME             -0.015 <0.01
SQRT_POP_DENSITY x TIME             3.7E-05 0.43 
THIN_FILM x TIME             0.042 <0.01
R-SQUARED 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.29 
OBSERVATIONS (n) 12,856 12,856 12,856 12,856 
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Table 13.  Regression Results for CPUC Dataset (Completed Systems Only)  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Variable 
coef. p coef. p coef. p coef. p 
INTERCEPT 11.989 <0.01 9.926 0.76 11.286 <0.01 12.938 <0.01 
TIME_MONTH -0.037 <0.01 -0.037 0.52 -0.037 <0.01 -0.085 0.08 
LN_SYSTEM_SIZE -0.431 <0.01 -0.441 <0.01 -0.453 <0.01 -0.527 0.11 
SCE 0.035 0.87 0.039 0.85 0.050 0.82 -0.032 0.88 
SDG&E -0.273 0.28 -0.227 0.39 -0.065 0.88 -0.398 0.12 
OTHER_UTILITY -0.384 0.20 -0.381 0.21 -0.151 0.73 -0.380 0.27 
OTHER_INCENTIVES 0.827 0.01 0.836 0.01 0.869 <0.01 0.728 0.05 
INSTALLER_EXPERIENCE -0.470 0.01 -0.452 0.02 -0.451 0.02 -0.693 0.45 
CALIF_CONST_AUTHORITY -4.210 <0.01 -4.230 <0.01 -4.181 <0.01 -3.766 <0.01 
THIN_FILM 0.081 0.75 0.084 0.74 0.077 0.75 -2.929 0.05 
MODULE_COST_INDEX     -0.842 0.16         
MAX_STD_REBATE     1.072 0.87         
STATE_TAX_CREDIT         -0.408 0.82     
RETAIL_RATES         5.461 0.46     
DATE_MONTH x LN_SIZE             0.006 0.62 
INSTALLER_EXP x LN_SIZE             -0.206 0.30 
THIN_FILM x LN_SIZE             0.683 0.02 
INSTALLER_EXP x TIME             0.056 <0.01 
THIN_FILM x TIME             0.003 0.90 
R-SQUARED 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.37 
OBSERVATIONS (n) 327 327 327 327 
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